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THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Robert Post
Commercial speech doctrine is presently controversial and confused. In this
Lecture, Professor Robert Post offers an hypothesis about why the U.S. Supreme
Court has extended First Amendment protection to commercial speech, and he
then uses this hypothesis to elucidate the disputes that presently engulf the doctrine.
Post argues that commercial speech is protected because of its informational
function. This contrasts sharply with public discourse, which is protected to ensure
forms of participation necessary to sustain democratic legitimacy. The bounda-
ries that separate commercial speech from public discourse reflect sociological
judgments about whether particular forms of communication are valued merely
as information, or instead as forms of communicative action that embody demo-
cratic participation. Post explores how the Court makes these judgments. The
distinction between the constitutional function of commercial speech and that of
public discourse explains why the state can compel disclosures, impose overbroad
regulations, and establish prior restraints within the domain of commercial speech,
but not within the domain of public discourse. Post also analyzes in detail the
Central Hudson test, which sets forth the standards by which the Court currently
decides whether regulation of commercial speech is constitutionally justified. The
test is abstract and unhelpful, because it does not reflect any particular account
of the constitutional function of commercial speech. Post assesses the ways in
which the Central Hudson test can be rendered consistent with the constitu-
tional justifications for protecting commercial speech, paying particular attention
to current controversies regarding whether the state can suppress truthful com-
mercial speech in order to modify behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court reversed its longstanding
conclusion that "the Constitution imposes no . . . restraint on government"
regulation of "purely commercial advertising."' The announcement spawned
what has since become known as "commercial speech" doctrine, a notori-
ously unstable and contentious domain of First Amendment jurisprudence.
No other realm of First Amendment law has proved as divisive. Some
adamantly support the Court's original position depriving commercial
speech of constitutional protection,' whereas others are unable to discern any
"philosophical or historical basis for asserting that 'commercial' speech is of
'lower value' than 'noncommercial' speech. "3
1. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). Chrestensen was overruled in Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 598-99
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 787-90 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
cf. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52; Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 748, 812-18
(1999); C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1,
3 (1976); Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance
and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 352-55 (1978); Vincent Blasi, The Pathological
Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 484-89 (1985); Thomas H. Jackson
& John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65
VA. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1979).
3. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring);
see Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 628
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Striving to preserve a middle ground between these two extremes, the
Court has sought to fashion a doctrine that '.rests heavily on 'the common-
sense distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction... and
other varieties of speech."'4 This distinction is said to justify the conclusion
"that 'commercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commen-
surate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,'
and is subject to 'modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the
realm of noncommercial expression.""
Although the Court has persistently adjudged commercial speech to be
"subordinate," it has never explained why this might be true.6 Lacking firm
jurisprudential foundations, commercial speech doctrine has veered wildly
between divergent and inconsistent approaches. A 1986 opinion by the
Court was so solicitous of government restrictions as to suggest to commen-
tators that commercial speech doctrine was "[left for dead,"7 whereas a 1996
opinion was so protective as to render it "unclear why 'commercial speech'
should continue to be treated as a separate category of speech isolated from
general First Amendment principles."8
The Court has proved susceptible to such wide swings of perspective
because its "common-sense" attitude to commercial speech has systemati-
cally obscured two critical questions. These were concisely stated, appropri-
ately enough, by William Van Alstyne in his 1995 Melville B. Nimmer
Memorial Lecture: "What is 'commercial' speech, and ... how, if at all,
may commercial speech be treated differently, or less favorably, than other
(1990); Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the
Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429, 452-48 (1971); Rodney A. Smolla,
Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial
Speech, 71 TEX. L. REV. 777, 780 (1993); cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and
Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 123.
4. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (quoting Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)).
5. Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (alteration in original) (quoting Ohralik, 436
U.S. at 456).
6. "[The still-dominant test devised by the Court is simply a quantitatively-reduced
protection afforded to commercial speech, as compared to noncommercial speech." Daniel
Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Constitutional Status of Social Institutions,
147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 792 (1999). For a recent spirited defense of the Court's commercial speech
jurisprudence, as well as a full account of the critical dissatisfaction that it has engendered, see
Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L. REV. 55 (1999).
7. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 123. The opinion was Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism
Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986). For contemporaneous commentary, see Philip B. Kurland, Posadas de
Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: "'Twas Strange, 'Twas Passing Strange; 'Twas Pitiful, 'Twas
Wondrous Pitiful," 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
8. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 126. The opinion was 44 Liquormart, Inc.
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speech... ?"9 In this Nimmer Lecture, the last of the twentieth century, I pro-
pose to pursue the two inquiries posed by Van Alstyne.
In Part I of this Lecture, I discuss how the constitutional category of
"commercial speech" might be defined for purposes of the First Amend-
ment. A definition of the category should explain, first, how commercial
speech differs from forms of expression that receive "core"'" First Amendment
protections. And it should explain, second, how the category of commercial
speech ought to be distinguished from the innumerable kinds of commercial
communications, ranging from professional speech to product safety warnings,
that do not receive the First Amendment protections even of "commercial
speech."
I argue, that core First Amendment protections extend to those forms
of communication that are deemed necessary to ensure that a democratic
state remains responsive to the views of its citizens. The Court has called
these forms of communication "public discourse,"" and it has endowed them
with constitutional value because they are regarded as constituting partici-
pation in the process of democratic self-governance. Commercial speech, by
contrast, consists of communication about commercial matters that conveys
information necessary for public decision making, but that does not itself
form part of public discourse. Commercial speech differs from public discourse
because it is constitutionally valued merely for the information it dissemi-
nates, rather than for being itself a valuable way of participating in demo-
cratic self-determination.
Commercial speech doctrine protects only certain kinds of commercial
communications that disseminate information, however, and I argue that
these are communications distributed through an impersonal public commu-
nicative sphere in which persons are understood to be independent and rational.
Commercial communications that do not receive the First Amendment
protections of commercial speech doctrine, by contrast, typically occur in
social settings that are personal, or that involve persons who are deemed
dependent, vulnerable, or not fully rational.
9. William Van Alstyne, Essay, Remembering Melville Nimmer: Some Cautionary Notes on
Commercial Speech, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1635, 1637 (1996) (footnote omitted).
10. See Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1185 (1988). On the First Amendment contrast between "core" and "periphery,"
see David F. McGowan, A.Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REV. 359, 430-36
(1990).
11. See Robert C. Post, Between Democracy and Community: The Legal Constitution of Social
Form, in NOMOS XXXV: DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY 163 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds.,
1993).
12. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995); Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988).
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In Part II of this Lecture, I argue that the particular constitutional values
defining commercial speech illuminate many of the doctrinal rules that
apply to it. Ironically, the "subordinate" status of commercial speech is a con-
sequence of the fact that commercial speech doctrine expresses the theory,
first articulated by Alexander Meiklejohn, that the constitutional function
of communication is to inform an audience of citizens about matters perti-
nent to democratic decision making. First Amendment protections of public
discourse, by contrast, tend to focus on safeguarding the capacity of speakers
to participate in the process of self-governance. This contrast between a
Meiklejohnian account of self-determination and what might be called a
participatory theory of self-governance" illuminates why commercial speech
doctrine does not prohibit compelled speech, overbroad government
regulations, or prior restraints.
The fundamental flaw in contemporary commercial speech doctrine,
however, is that its primary doctrinal standard, the so-called Central Hudson
test, 4 is so vague and abstract as to fail entirely to express any specific con-
stitutional values. Allegiance to the formal terms of the Central Hudson test
has masked growing differences within the Court about the rationale and
purpose of commercial speech doctrine. In recent years these differences have
grown so sharp that they threaten the very coherence of the doctrine. I con-
clude this Lecture by assessing these differences and suggesting possible refor-
mulations of the Central Hudson test that might enable it more accurately
to reflect the theoretical justifications of commercial speech doctrine.
I. DEFINING COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Commercial advertising comprises the core of the constitutional category
of "commercial speech." But sometimes advertising is deemed to be public
discourse rather than commercial speech,'5 and sometimes expression that
would not ordinarily be regarded as advertising is included within the category
of commercial speech. 6 The boundaries of the category are thus quite blurred.
It might be thought that we could sharpen our apprehension of the
category by identifying particular characteristics uniquely shared by all commu-
nicative acts within it. But efforts to pursue this line of analysis have proved
13. On the distinction between Meiklejohnian and participatory theories of democratic
self-government, see ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY,
MANAGEMENT 268-89 (1995). See also Robert Post, Equality and Autonomy in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1517 (1997) (addressing theories of self-government).
14. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
For a full statement of the test, see infra text accompanying note 155.
15. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964).
16. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
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frustrating. Commercial speech cannot be defined by a set of characteristics
uniquely shared by its speakers, because no such characteristics can be speci-
fied. Although it is true that commercial speakers are typically paid for their
speech and that they communicate in order to earn profits, so also do many
speakers whose communications receive the "full" protection of the First
Amendment earn recompense for their speech and publish for profit."
Although it is true that commercial speakers seek to solicit for the sale of goods,
so also do many speakers who engage in fully protected forms of speech. 8
If we instead seek to define commercial speech by its content, rather
than by the attributes of its speakers, we confront the paradox that the classi-
fication of any particular communication can sometimes depend entirely
upon the identity of its speaker. A pharmacist who advertises drug prices is
said to engage in commercial speech, 9 but the publication of these same prices
by Consumer Reports would likely merit full First Amendment protection.20
Certainly the pamphlet describing venereal disease and condoms, which the
Court deemed commercial speech when distributed by a condom manu-
facturer,2' would receive full protection if published by an AIDS prevention
22group.
17. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959) (books); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (motion pictures).
18. See, e.g., Viii. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 630-32
(1980); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945) (holding that First Amendment protection
cannot be denied merely because "an organization for which the rights of free speech ... are
claimed is one 'engaged in business activities' or that the individual who leads it in exercising
these rights receives compensation for doing so"); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110-
12(1943).
19. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
761 (1976).
20. See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 210 n.58 (1985); Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech
and First Amendment Theory, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 372, 381-83 (1979); Steven Shiffrin, The First
Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW.
U. L. REV. 1212, 1257 (1983).
21. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67. The eight-page pamphlet discussed "at length the problem of
venereal disease and the use and advantages of condoms in aiding the prevention of venereal
disease." Id. at 63 n.4.
22. Just as it is impossible to specify uniquely the attributes of commercial speech, so it is impos-
sible to specify a set of government purposes that apply only to commercial speech. It is sometimes
said, for example, that commercial speech gives rise to a special government interest in suppressing
"misleading" communication. Thus Justice John Paul Stevens has written that "any description of
commercial speech that is intended to identify the category of speech entitled to less First Amend-
ment protection should relate to the reasons for permitting broader regulation: namely, commercial
speech's potential to mislead." Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476,494 (1995) (Stevens, J., con-
curring); see 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (Stevens, J., plurality
opinion) (joined by Kennedy, J. and Ginsburg, J.). But the danger of "misleading" communication
exists in fully protected speech as well as in commercial speech. It is certainly as important to regulate
misleading political advertisements as it is to police misleading commercial advertisements for
eggs. See Nat'l Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157, 162-63 (7th Cir. 1977). If the
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The impossibility of uniquely identifying the attributes of commercial
speech has been much noted. In 1976, Justice Harry Blackmun asserted that
the very obscurity of the category of commercial speech meant that it could
23not be entirely without First Amendment protection. In recent times com-
mentators have urged that this same obscurity implies that commercial
speech cannot be systematically relegated to a subordinate First Amendment
position.24  Whatever its implications, the impossibility of specifying the
parameters that define the category of commercial speech has haunted its
jurisprudence and scholarship.
On close inspection, however, this difficulty may derive from an implicit
presumption about what ought to count as a satisfactory definition. We have
sought to define the category of commercial speech by searching for unique char-
acteristics possessed by speech acts included within the category. But the
issue can be approached from a different angle. We might seek to define the
category by reference to the constitutional values it is designed to serve. It is
not uncommon for First Amendment categories to be defined in this way.
I have argued elsewhere, for example, that the boundaries of "public
discourse" are normatively defined. Public discourse is comprised of those
processes of communication that must remain open to the participation of
citizens if democratic legitimacy is to be maintained." The basic idea is that
democratic legitimacy depends upon citizens having the warranted belief
that their government is responsive to their wishes. Public discourse consists
of the various kinds of communicative action to which citizens must have
unrestricted access if this belief is to be sustained. Within public discourse
citizens forge, in the words of Learned Hand, the "public opinion which is
the final source of government in a democratic state."26 The possibility of par-
ticipating in the formation of public opinion authorizes citizens to imagine
themselves as included within the process of collective self-determination. 7
First Amendment treats the two forms of regulation differently, as it surely does, see Shiffrin, supra
note 20, at 1231, it is not because the government interest in ensuring accurate information is any
less for political, than for commercial speech. It is rather because commercial speech and political
discourse implicate different kinds of constitutional values.
23. See Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761-62.
24. See, e.g., Kozinski & Banner, supra note 3.
25. See, e.g., Robert Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1990)
[hereinafter Post, Constitutional Concept]; Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy
and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993) [hereinafter Post, Meiklejohn's
Mistake].
26. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
27. For an argument that the right to vote is by itself insufficient to maintain this sense of
inclusion, see Post, supra note 13, at 1525-28.
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This is what I have called the "participatory" model of democratic self-
governance.
Just as the participatory model suggests that the definition of the cate-
gory of public discourse is determined by reference to constitutional values,"
so I argue in this Lecture that the category of commercial speech should also be
defined by reference to constitutional values. The question, therefore, is what
constitutional values the category of commercial speech might be designed to
serve.
When he invented the contemporary category of commercial speech
in his opinion in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc.,29 Justice Blackmun proposed that the category was necessary to
implement two distinct constitutional values.
Advertising... is nonetheless dissemination of information as to who
is producing and selling what product, for what reason, and at what
price. So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy,
the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through
numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public
interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well
informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is
indispensable.... And if it is indispensable to the proper allocation
of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the
formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regu-
lated or altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment were
thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decision-
making in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of infor-
mation does not serve that goal.30
Justice Blackmun's first suggestion is that commercial speech ought to be
constitutionally protected in order to ensure "the proper allocation of resources
in a free enterprise system." Generalizing from the needs of consumers who
might urgently require information about drug prices, Blackmun in Virginia
Pharmacy concludes that "society also may have a strong interest in the free
flow of commercial information."31 He argues, in effect, that "the efficient allo-
cation of resources depends upon informed consumer choices,"32 which in turn
28. For a full discussion, see Post, Constitutional Concept, supra note 25, at 667-84.
29. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
30. Id. at 765.
31. Id. at 763-64.
32. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 9 (1979).
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requires the free circulation of commercial information. Later cases have
specifically reaffirmed this reasoning."
Although economic efficiency is no doubt an important consideration
for government policy, it is difficult to see why it should be a specifically
First Amendment concern. As Steven Shiffrin pointedly asks, "Why should
allocation of resources be a First Amendment worry?"3 The First Amendment
does not require courts to scrutinize government actions that directly interfere
with the efficiency of the market, as for example by setting prices or pro-
hibiting products. Why then should the First Amendment be concerned with
the more indirect effects of advertising regulations on market efficiency?
A tempting response to this question is that advertising is a form of com-
munication, and the First Amendment is always triggered when the govern-
ment regulates "speech as such."" There are, however, three reasons why
this temptation ought to be firmly resisted. The first is that it is probably false
to say that the First Amendment is triggered whenever government regulates
"speech as such."36 I have elsewhere argued this point at length,37 but suffice
it to say that social life is full of communicative processes that are routinely
regulated without the benefit of First Amendment analysis. The process of
contract formation, for example, consists entirely of communication, but its
regulation does not trigger First Amendment scrutiny. Such scrutiny is brought
to bear only when the regulation of communication affects a constitutional
value specifically protected by the First Amendment.
Second, even if "speech as such" were to trigger some form of First Amend-
ment protection, we would not know the nature of that protection until we
could assess the constitutional values potentially imperiled by government
33. In his opinion for the Court in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1995),
for example, Justice Clarence Thomas cites economic efficiency as the reason why the First Amend-
ment protects commercial speech:
Though we once took the position that the First Amendment does not protect com-
mercial speech, we repudiated that position in Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. There we noted that the free flow of commercial infor-
mation is "indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system"
because it informs the numerous private decisions that drive the system. Indeed, we observed
that a "particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information ... may
be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate."
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763, 765).
34. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 40
(1999).
35. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 478 (1997) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); see Smolla, supra note 3, at 780.
36. Frederick Schauer demonstrated this point almost two decades ago. See Frederick Schauer,
Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 268-71 (1981).
37. See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1254-55
(1995).
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regulation. First Amendment protections vary depending upon the con-
stitutional significance of the speech that the government seeks to regulate,3 s
and this significance is measured by the constitutional values that we understand
the First Amendment to serve. Whatever constitutional values we attribute
to the First Amendment, however, will necessarily distinguish between com-
municative acts that are pertinent to their fulfillment and those that are not."
This is true even of the most general kinds of First Amendment values, like
autonomy or self-realization. 4° It is not clear, then, what it would even mean
to claim that "speech as such" is constitutionally protected, because as soon as
one specifies the constitutional values necessary to give shape and substance
to that protection, particular communicative acts that do not serve these values
will be excluded.
Third, even if "speech as such" were to merit some form of First Amend-
ment protection, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that the constitutional
value by which such protection should be measured is that of efficiently
allocating resources in a free-market society. To locate such a value in the First
Amendment would be to justify Chief Justice William Rehnquist's charge
that the jurisprudence of commercial speech is really a revival of "the dis-
credited doctrine" of substantive due process "of cases such as Lochner v.
New York and Tyson & Brother v. Banton."'" The First Amendment cannot
be understood as a repository of microeconomic theory, as the champion of
a particular (and contested) view of proper market functioning. To the
contrary, the First Amendment creates the very space in which all potential
theories of marketplace functioning can be debated and evaluated. Nothing
could be more damaging to the First Amendment than to equate it with a
specific economic perspective, and in this way to transform it into a mere "basis
for reviewing economic regulations."42
For these reasons, commercial speech doctrine should not be defended
on the ground that commercial advertising serves the First Amendment
value of market efficiency. We must turn, then, to the second constitutional
principle that Blackmun articulates in Virginia Pharmacy. This principle
38. See POST, supra note 13, at 16-17; infra notes 217-221 and accompanying text.
39. See Post, supra note 37, at 1271-73. So, for example, if the constitutional value of
speech is thought to lie in its "truth-seeking function," Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46, 52 (1988), then the Constitution will protect only those speech acts that facilitate this function.
40. See Baker, supra note 2; Post, supra note 37, at 1272-73.
41. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 591 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see id. at 589; Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 2, at 25-33; Cass R.
Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 883-84 (1987); David Yassky, Eras of the
First Amendment, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1699, 1737 (1991).
42. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 476 (1997).
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concerns the enlightenment of "public decisionmaking in a democracy.'
Blackmun contends that commercial speech facilitates a "free flow of com-
mercial information" that "may be of general public interest."" According
to this approach, commercial speech should receive constitutional protection
in order to safeguard "the essential role that the free flow of information
plays in a democratic society."4
Underlying this approach is the notion that citizens may acquire infor-
mation from commercial speech that is highly relevant to the formation of
democratic public opinion. Democratic public opinion, in turn, is the ultimate
source of government decision making. If citizens learn from commercial
advertising that pharmacy drugs are too expensive, for example, they might
organize politically to advocate within public discourse for the creation of
national health insurance. If they learn from commercial advertising that
the cost of gasoline is on the rise, they might organize politically to advocate
within public discourse for government price controls.
Commercial speech might also be relevant to the formation of public
opinion in a second and ultimately more profound sense. Although public
discourse includes specific debates about potential policy decisions, it is also
an arena suffused with intense and contentious articulations of collective
identity." Within public discourse, heterogeneous and conflicting visions
of national identity continuously collide and reconcile. These visions may or
may not have immediate policy implications, but they are nevertheless highly
significant for the general orientation of the nation. Visions of the good life
articulated within commercial advertisements are relevant to this process.
Any observer of the American scene would report that advertising deeply
influences our sense of ourselves as a nation.47 The canonical photographs of
Walker Evans, for example, poignantly chronicle the significance of
43. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
44. Id. at 764.
45. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 512 (1996) (Stevens, J., plurality
opinion) (joined by Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., and Ginsburg, J.). The year after Virginia Pharmacy,
Justice Harry Blackmun again referred to the two distinct constitutional justifications for commercial
speech doctrine, but with a slightly different emphasis:
The listener's interest is substantial: the consumer's concern for the free flow of commercial
speech often may be far keener than his concern for urgent political dialogue. Moreover,
significant societal interests are served by such speech. Advertising, though entirely
commercial, may often carry information of import to significant issues of the day. And
commercial speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature, and prices of
products and services, and thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of
resources in a free enterprise system.
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (citation omitted).
46. See Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake, supra note 25, at 1116-19.
47. See, e.g., Stuart Ewen, Advertising and the Development of Consumer Society, in CULTURAL
POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 82 (Ian Angus & Sut Jhally eds., 1989).
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commercial advertisements as embodiments of personal and national ideals.48
This kind of influence is probably as important to the formation of demo-
cratic public opinion, and hence to public decision making, as the discrete
price information at stake in Virginia Pharmacy.
This explanation of the constitutional value of commercial speech
resonates with traditional First Amendment reasoning.49 Almost from the
outset of its First Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has viewed freedom of
speech as serving the purpose of democratic self-government." There are, how-
ever, competing theories about how this purpose should be understood.
One theory, which has deeply informed the development of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence, is the participatory model, the outlines of which I have
already sketched. The participatory model emphasizes the importance of
preserving uncensored access to public discourse so that citizens can maintain
the warranted sense that their government is responsive to them."1 The
participatory model protects public discourse in order to preserve a necessary
(but not sufficient) precondition for democratic legitimation. Commercial
speech, however, does not seem a likely candidate for inclusion within
public discourse, because we most naturally understand persons who are adver-
tising products for sale as seeking to advance their commercial interests
rather than as participating in the public life of the nation. We do not char-
acterize them as inviting reciprocal dialogue or discussion; nor do we perceive
their speech as an effort to make the state responsive to them. We instead
view them as attempting to sell products. If pressed, this is not ultimately a
judgment about the motivations of particular persons, but instead about the
social significance of a certain kind of speech. 2
48. The recent Walker Evans exhibition at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York,
for example, illustrates the extent to which Evans was seized by manifold ways in which the
utopian aspirations of mass marketing images affected the perspectives of his subjects, particularly
amid the harsh realities of the Depression. See WALKER EVANS (compiled by Metro. Museum of
Art, N.Y., 2000).
49. "[Tihe Court recognized that commercial advertising indirectly contributes to the ends
traditionally served by the [F]irst [A]mendment by supplying the public with information, images,
and values that may enter into the discussion of public issues .... Thomas W. Merrill, Comment, First
Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L.
REV. 205, 226-27 (1976).
50. In one of its earliest opinions, for example, the Court reasoned that "The maintenance
of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to
the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means ... is a fundamental
principle of our constitutional system." Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
51. For a brief explanation of the participatory model, see supra notes 25-27 and accom-
panying text.
52. It is not uncommon for First Amendment jurisprudence to employ categorical judgments
in this way, to decide what kinds of communicative acts will be included or excluded from public
discourse. A similar categorical judgment is visible, for example, in the Court's effort to distinguish
public discourse from obscenity: "'The protection given speech and press was fashioned to assure
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It remains true, however, that commercial speech affects public discourse.
The impact of commercial speech on the formation of public opinion may
be conceived as a by-product of the effort to sell goods. To capture this insight,
Blackmun appeals in Virginia Pharmacy to a theory of democratic self-govemance
that is quite different from the participatory model. Blackmun summons
instead the account of Alexander Meiklejohn.
Meiklejohn famously argued that "the final aim" of First Amendment
freedom is to ensure the circulation of opinion and information necessary
for "the voting of wise decisions."5 Meiklejohn believed that constitutional
protections should be focused on the rights of citizens to receive information,
rather than on the rights of speakers to express themselves. That is why he
concluded that "[wihat is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that
everything worth saying shall be said." 4 In the succinct words of a modem
Meiklejohnian: "We allow people to speak so others can vote. Speech allows
people to vote intelligently and freely, aware of all the options and in pos-
session of all the relevant information.""5 Meiklejohn's influence is perceptible
in various areas of First Amendment doctrine, most notably in the regulation
of broadcast media, in which the Court has held that "[iut is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."5
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.' But the public portrayal of hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the ensuing
commercial gain, is a different matter." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34-35 (1973) (citation
omitted) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). For other examples, see
Post, Constitutional Concept, supra note 25, at 676-77. Such categorical judgments are the means
by which constitutional law distinguishes and evaluates discrete social practices. For examples, see
Post, supra note 37, at 1274-75, and infra text accompanying notes 63-69.
53. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF
THE PEOPLE 26 (1960).
54. Id.
55. OWEN M. FiSS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF
STATE POWER 13 (1996). Of course it is somewhat ironic to attribute protection for commercial
speech to a Meiklejohnian analysis, because it was Alexander Meiklejohn himself who remarked
that "[tihe constitutional status of a merchant advertising his wares ... is utterly different from
that of a citizen who is planning for the general welfare." MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 53, at 37. See
Halberstam, supra note 6, at 805-15; Redish, supra note 3, at 434-38. Meiklejohn took the town
meeting as the essential model for protected speech, and he thus might well have assumed that
constitutional safeguards extended only to those who, unlike merchants advertising their wares,
meant to participate in the public dialogue of the town meeting. But his sharp focus on the
constitutional importance of the flow of information to voters is in tension with this assumption,
and there is certainly a plausible Meiklejohnian logic to the position that information about
commercial prices and products is necessary in order to inform democratic decision making.
56. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). For a discussion, see Robert
C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 158-61 (1996). The speech of broadcasters is
regulated in ways that would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to participants in public
discourse. See, e.g., FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm'n for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 800 (1978); Miami Herald
Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). The difference lies in the fact that broadcasters,
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The Court's development of commercial speech doctrine closely tracks
Meiklejohn's analysis. The Court has been quite explicit that commercial
speech should be constitutionally protected so as to safeguard the circula-
tion of information. It has therefore focused its analysis on the need to receive
information, rather than on the rights of speakers. Two years after Virginia
Pharmacy, for example, the Court declared that
the First Amendment goes beyond protection of... the self-
expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the
stock of information from which members of the public may draw. A
commercial advertisement is constitutionally protected not so much
because it pertains to the seller's business as because it furthers the
societal interest in the "free flow of commercial information."
57
And in the authoritative case of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Services Commission," the Court flatly pronounced that "[t]he First Amend-
ment's concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function
of advertising.,
59
This focus on information introduces an important point of difference
from the First Amendment protections that apply to public discourse. It is a
necessary condition for democratic legitimacy that citizens have free access to
public discourse, because censoring a citizen's ability to contribute to public
opinion renders the government, with respect to that citizen, "heteronomous
and nondemocratic."6 Many of the First Amendment safeguards of public
discourse therefore are speaker oriented.61 Commercial speech doctrine, by
contrast, is sharply audience oriented. From a constitutional point of view, the
censorship of commercial speech does not endanger the process of democratic
legitimation. It does not threaten to alienate citizens from their govern-
unlike newspapers, are in some respects constitutionally regarded as public trustees for the interests of
the public, rather than as independent participants in public discourse. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad.
Co., 395 U.S. at 389-90.
57. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Va. Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976)).
58. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
59. Id. at 563; see Farber, supra note 20, at 384.
60. Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 267, 290 (1991). For a full discussion, see id. at 279-85.
61. See Post, supra note 13, at 1526-28. I do not mean to imply, of course, that ordinary
First Amendment protections do not also extend to audiences. For one thing, the participatory
model of democratic self-governance seeks to preserve the potential for the kinds of speaker-audience
relationships that constitute our concept of "participation." See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 867 (1982) (Brennan, J.); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). For another,
the participatory model stresses the importance of collective self-determination, which requires
constitutional protection for the dialogue and exchange of information within which that self-
determination can responsibly proceed. See POST, supra note 13, at 272-76. These protections must
extend to both speakers and audience.
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ment or to render the state heteronomous With respect to speakers. Instead
it merely jeopardizes the circulation of information relevant to "the voting of
wise decisions. 62
We may thus construct a rough and incomplete definition of commercial
speech as the set of communicative acts about commercial subjects that con-
veys information of relevance to democratic decision making, but that does
not itself form part of public discourse. There are, however, two difficulties
with this definition. The first is that it does not explain how speech can pro-
vide information of relevance to public decision making and yet not be part
of public discourse. The second is that the definition is vastly overinclusive,
because there are numerous forms of speech about commercial subjects that
contain information relevant to democratic decision making and yet that
do not receive even the weak protection afforded to commercial speech.
To understand the definition I have proposed, therefore, it is necessary
to explore carefully two distinctions that are implicit within it. The first con-
cerns the difference between commercial speech and public discourse; the
second concerns the difference between commercial speech and the many
communicative acts about commercial subjects that are not included within
the First Amendment protections of commercial speech doctrine.
A. The Distinction Between Commercial Speech and Public Discourse
It is useful to investigate how the Court constructs the boundary between
public discourse and commercial speech in the context of specific cases.
Consider, for example, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 63 in which the Court had
before it a city ordinance requiring that "all persons ... soliciting ... orders
for goods... or merchandise of any kind" purchase a license." The Court
found it unconstitutional to apply this ordinance to Jehovah's Witnesses
engaged in "door to door" solicitation for the purchase of "certain religious
books and pamphlets. 6 The Court stated:
The alleged justification for the exaction of this license tax is the fact
that the religious literature is distributed with a solicitation of
funds.... Situations will arise where it will be difficult to determine
whether a particular activity is religious or purely commercial.... As
we stated only the other day, in Jamison v. Texas, "The states can
62. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 53, at 26; see Halberstam, supra note 6, at 831-32; Burt
Neuborne, A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating Commercial Speech, 46 BROOK. L. REV. 437,
454 (1980). 1 should stress that the "information" disseminated by commercial speech includes the
visions of collective identity powerfully present in advertising.
63. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
64. Id. at 106.
65. Id.
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prohibit the use of the streets for the distribution of purely com-
mercial leaflets, even though such leaflets may have 'a civic appeal, or
a moral platitude' appended.... They may not prohibit the distribution
of handbills in the pursuit of a clearly religious activity merely
because the handbills invite the purchase of books for the improved
understanding of the religion or because the handbills seek in a lawful
fashion to promote the raising of funds for religious purposes." But
the mere fact that the religious literature is "sold" by itinerant preachers
rather than "donated" does not transform evangelism into a com-
mercial enterprise .... The constitutional rights of those spreading
their religious beliefs through the spoken and printed word are not to
be gauged by standards governing retailers or wholesalers of books.
The right to use the press for expressing one's views is not to be
measured by the protection afforded commercial handbills.... It is
plain that a religious organization needs funds to remain a going
concern.... [Tihe problem of drawing the line between a purely
commercial activity and a religious one will at times be difficult. On
this record it plainly cannot be said that petitioners were engaged in
66
a commercial rather than a religious venture.
The passage repays close reading. The Court poses the question of whether
the Jehovah's Witnesses "were engaged in a commercial rather than a religious
venture." This question does not focus on the narrow communicative act of
selling a Bible, but rather on the larger "venture" or "activity" within which
the particular communicative act is embedded. Constitutional charac-
terization of the act of solicitation depends upon its context, for the Court
is explicit that hawking a Bible would present a different constitutional issue
if it merely involved the "venture" of retailing commercial goods.67
Murdock therefore turns on a judgment about what may be called the
social practice of religion. Essential to the case is an evaluation of what it
means to be a Jehovah's Witness, as distinct from a retailer of goods. The
Court concludes that the attempts of the Jehovah's Witnesses to sell religious
books should be understood as part of their efforts to support and spread
"their religious beliefs."68
66. Id. at 110-11 (citations omitted) (quoting Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943)).
67. Actually, the Court refers to the venture of retailing or wholesaling books. I have varied
the reference in text because a modern understanding of commercial speech doctrine might well
exclude advertisements for "activity that itself is protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment." Merrill,
supra note 49, at 235.
68. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 117. One can only imagine what kind of a conclusion the Court
would reach were it confronted with the case of a scientologist selling Dianetics by L. Ron Hubbard.
Would the scientologist be cast as a religious speaker? as a political disputant? as a merely
commercial salesman? The divide between commercial and political speech is constructed through
judgments like these, which involve the characterization of social practices.
HeinOnline -- 48 UCLA L. Rev. 16 2000-2001
The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech
The conclusion that the solicitations of the Jehovah's Witnesses
should legally be regarded as inseparable from their engagement in religious
"evangelism" exemplifies the way in which constitutional law presupposes active
judicial characterization of the social world. The conclusion requires the
Court to address the question of whether evangelism should be understood
as a protected effort to shape public opinion. Because the Court is clear that
religious dialogue is "essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on
the part of the citizens of a democracy,"69 it holds that the solicitations of the
Jehovah's Witnesses should receive full constitutional protection.
The logic that underlies Murdock is thus complex and subtle. It requires
the Court to determine, first, the place of the Jehovah's Witnesses' solicita-
tions within the venture of religious evangelism, and, second, the place of such
evangelism within the creation of the public opinion necessary for democratic
self-governance. Both these judgments are thoroughly evaluative, because
both ultimately turn on charting and classifying the social world in order
best to serve the constitutional value of democratic self-determination.
This kind of analysis is typical in decisions in which the Court has
attempted to distinguish commercial speech from public discourse. Take,
for example, a case like Thomas v. Collins, ° in which the Court had to
decide whether a Texas statute requiring labor organizers to register with
the state "before soliciting any members for""1 their organizations was to be
construed as a restraint on public discourse or instead as a simple regulation
of "business practice,7 2 "like selling insurance, dealing in securities, acting
as commission merchant, pawnbroking, etc."73
The Court observed that
it does not resolve where the line shall be drawn.., merely to
urge... that an organization for which the rights of free speech and
free assembly are claimed is one "engaged in business activities" or
that the individual who leads it in exercising these rights receives
compensation for doing so. These comparisons are at once too simple,
too general, and too inaccurate to be determinative. Where the line
shall be placed in a particular application rests, not on such generali-
ties, but on the concrete clash of particular interests and the community's
relative evaluation both of them and of how the one will be affected by the
specific restriction, the other by its absence.
74
69. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
70. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
71. Id. at 519 n.1.
72. Id. at 527.
73. Id. at 526.
74. Id. at 531.
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The Court explicitly concludes that no simple fact, like the presence of a
business interest or compensation, can distinguish commercial from political
speech. Particular facts are of course relevant, but, viewed in isolation, not
determinative. What is determinative is the achievement of constitutional
purposes. Normative judgments of this kind, as the sociologist Philip Selznick
observes, always require "contextual thinking,"75 a close attention to "textured
meanings and concrete understandings. 76
Selznick's observation explains why the contemporary Court has in its
commercial speech doctrine persistently gestured toward "the 'commonsense'
distinction 77 between commercial speech and "speech at the First Amend-
ment's core."78 The evaluations of "commonsense". are complex, contextual, and
ultimately inarticulate; the Court's appeal to common sense acknowledges
that the achievement of constitutional purposes cannot be reduced to any
simple rule or determinate criteria. The judgments of common sense ultimately
revolve around questions of social meaning; they turn on whether the utter-
ance of a particular speaker should be understood as an effort to engage
public opinion or instead simply to sell products. The Court is thus quite mis-
leading occasionally to assert that commercial speech can be distinguished
from public discourse merely on the basis of its content, as though com-
mercial speech were any communication "that does no more than propose a
commercial transaction,"" or any "expression related solely to the economic
interests of thespeaker and its audience.""0
Murdock and Thomas suggest that the distinction between commercial
speech and public discourse turns very much on precisely what it means to
relate "solely" to economic interests, or to do "no more" than propose a trans-
action. These phrases must be understood to reflect judgments about "the
character of the expressive activity" at issue,8 judgments that necessarily
entail an assessment of the nature and constitutional significance of the larger
social practice within which that activity is embedded. 2 That is why com-
75. Philip Selznick, Foundations of Communitarian Liberalism, RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY,
Fall 1994, at 16, 21.
76. PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL THEORY AND THE PROMISE
OF COMMUNITY 323 (1992).
77. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482 (1995).
78. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995).
79. United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 426 (1993); see also Bd. of Trs. v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 n.24 (1976).
80. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
81. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 n.32 (1978).
82. In Primus, for example, the Court held that the solicitation of a public interest American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) lawyer should be regarded as public discourse. This conclusion
rested on a categorical judgment that there was "no basis for equating the work of lawyers associated
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mercial speech cannot be transformed into public discourse merely by
altering its content to insert assertions about matters of public concern. "
In Thomas, the Court concluded that the solicitation of union members
should not be regarded as a narrowly commercial communication. Just as in
Murdock the Court had viewed the solicitation of Jehovah's Witnesses as con-
stitutionally inseparable from the practice of religious evangelism, so in Thomas
the Court characterized the labor organizer's solicitation as inseparable from
the efforts of union labor to participate in the formation of public opinion.4
And the Court had no doubt but that such efforts were to be included within
public discourse, because "[flree discussion concerning the conditions in indus-
try and the causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the effective
with the ACLU or the NAACP with that of a group that exists for the primary purpose of financial
gain through the recovery of counsel fees." Id. at 431. In the Court's view, "[tihe ACLU engages
in litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression and association," id., and public discourse
includes "'the opportunity to persuade to action, not merely to describe facts."' Id. at 432 (quoting
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945)).
83. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 n.5. The point is nicely illustrated by the facts
of Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), in which the city of New York enforced an
ordinance forbidding "distribution in the streets of commercial and business advertising matter"
against a businessman who sought to disseminate "a handbill advertising" a submarine "and soliciting
visitors for a stated admission fee." Id. at 53. The businessman cleverly responded by a creating
"double-faced handbill." Id.
On one side was a revision of the original, altered by the removal of the statement as to
admission fee but consisting only of commercial advertising. On the other side was a
protest against the action of the City Dock Department in refusing the respondent
wharfage facilities at a city pier for the exhibition of his submarine, but no commercial
advertising. The Police Department advised that distribution of a bill containing only
the protest would not ... be restrained, but that distribution of the double-faced bill was
prohibited.
Id. The businessman, in other words, sought to transform commercial speech into public discourse by
inserting words of political protest. When he was restrained by the police, he asserted that "he
was engaged in the dissemination of matter proper for public information, none the less so because
there was inextricably attached to the medium of such dissemination commercial advertising
matter." Id. at 55. The Court, however, would have none of it:
We need not indulge nice appraisal based upon subtle distinctions in the present instance
nor assume possible cases not now presented. It is enough for the present purpose that
the stipulated facts justify the conclusion that the affixing of the protest against official
conduct to the advertising circular was with the intent, and for the purpose, of evading
the prohibition of the ordinance. If that evasion were successful, every merchant who
desires to broadcast advertising leaflets in the streets need only append a civic appeal, or
a moral platitude, to achieve immunity from the law's command.
Id. It is clear, therefore, that Valentine holds that the category of commercial speech does not turn
merely on the specific content of particular words, but instead on a constitutional appraisal of "the
character of the expressive activity" at issue. Primus, 436 U.S. at 438 n.32. The content of words are
relevant to this appraisal, but not determinative.
84. "This case falls in the category of a public speech, rather than that of practicing a vocation
as solicitor." Thomas, 323 U.S. at 548 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny
of modem industrial society."85
Thomas thus displays the same analytic structure as Murdock. The Court
seeks, first, to ascertain the "character of the expressive activity" within which
a particular speech act is embedded, and then, second, to determine whether
that activity is to be included within public discourse.86 To include speech
within public discourse is to signify that it is constitutionally valued not merely
for the contribution it may make to public discussion, but also, intrinsically, for
the engagement it represents in the public life of the nation. A democracy
cannot flourish unless its citizens actively participate in the formation of its
public opinion. Such participation is "precious""7 and to be encouraged for its
own sake.
This perspective suggests a concise formulation of the First Amendment
difference between commercial speech and public discourse. The distinction
turns on whether constitutional value attaches to participation in a given
speech act, or whether constitutional value attaches instead only to the infor-
mation conveyed by the speech act.
B. The Distinction Between Commercial Speech
and Commercial Communications
The Court is fond of observing that "[ojur jurisprudence has emphasized
that 'commercial speech [enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commen-
surate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,'
and is subject to 'modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the
realm of noncommercial expression."'88 But this observation is highly mis-
leading, for it falsely implies that commercial speech receives tess protection
than all other forms of expression. Although the First Amendment protec-
tions extended to commercial speech are fewer and weaker than those
extended to public discourse, commercial speech in fact receives far greater
constitutional protection than many forms of commercial communication.
It has rightly been observed that there is a "universe of communication
relating only to business activity, having no explicit political or artistic or ideo-
85. Id. at 532 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1940)).
86. The Court's recent line of cases holding that charitable solicitations are part of public
discourse rather than commercial speech displays analogous reasoning. See, e.g., Vill. of Schaumburg
v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
87. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 131 (1992); see also United States
v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967).
88. Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989) (second alteration in original) (quoting Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)); see, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S.
618, 623 (1995).
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logical content, and yet differing substantially from the kind of widespread
public hawking of wares represented by the Virginia Pharmacy archetype." 9
These include
numerous communications among business executives about prices
and business practices now regulated by the Sherman Antitrust Act;
representations about products now regulated by various consumer
protection laws, by the Uniform Commercial Code, and by the
common law of warranty and contract; statements about willingness
to enter into a contract now regulated by the common law of contract;
and so on and on.90
Whatever First Amendment protection the commercial communications
within this larger universe are entitled to receive, it is clear that they do not
receive the specific constitutional safeguards created by commercial speech
doctrine.
Commercial speech doctrine is thus not merely about the boundary
that separates commercial speech from public discourse, but also about the
boundary that separates the category of "commercial speech" from the
surrounding sea of commercial communications that do not benefit from
the protections of the doctrine. If the construction of the first boundary must
answer to the question of why commercial speech receives less First Amend-
ment protection than public discourse, the construction of the second
boundary must answer to the question of why commercial speech doctrine
extends special First Amendment protections to some commercial com-
munications but not to others.
Although there are numerous cases in which the Court has more or
less explicitly addressed the distinction between commercial speech and
public discourse, there are few if any decisions in which the Court has
addressed the distinction between the First Amendment category of com-
mercial speech and these other forms of commercial communications. The
question is rendered even more confusing by the Court's conclusion that
"[flor commercial speech to come within [the First Amendment], it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading."' It is not clear whether
misleading speech is simply "commercial speech" that can be regulated by the
state, or whether it is instead excluded even from the category of "commercial
speech."
Consideration of the distinction between commercial speech and the
general category of commercial communications must thus be at best tentative
89. Schauer, supra note 10, at 1183; see Shiffrin, supra note 20, at 1213-14.
90. Schauer, supra note 10, at 1184 (footnote omitted).
91. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482 (1995) (second alteration in original)
(quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
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and speculative. In this part, I offer an analytic framework intended to illumi-
nate some of the issues involved in this distinction.
It is often quite useful to begin analysis by focusing on paradigmatic
cases. State efforts to prohibit advertisements for drug prices placed by a phar-
macist in a local newspaper would unambiguously be analyzed by the First
Amendment principles of commercial speech doctrine. An unobtrusive but
essential aspect of what makes this case exemplary is the fact that the
pharmacist's advertisements are placed in a newspaper.92 I have argued else-
where that newspapers are a medium for the communication of ideas, and
that such media constitute the "structural skeleton"9 of a public communi-
cative sphere. Sociologists have defined this sphere as a shared "universe of
discourse"'94 that unites persons who would otherwise be strangers by exposing
them "to similar social stimuli."" Within the public communicative sphere,
persons are presumed to be independent and rational,96 and to engage each
other through "critical interaction."97 The operation of democracy presupposes
and requires a public communicative sphere.9
A newspaper editorial discussing drug prices would be protected as
public discourse, because it would be regarded as an effort to participate in this
public communicative sphere in a manner that enacts the constitutional
value of democratic self-governance. A pharmacist advertising drug prices
in that same newspaper, however, would not be regarded as a participant in
public discourse, because her speech would not be deemed to enact the
value of democratic self-governance. Nevertheless the pharmacist's advertise-
ment, no less than the newspaper's editorial, would disseminate information
to the public at large and in this way serve the important constitutional
function of sustaining the public communicative sphere. This is an essential
insight of commercial speech doctrine.
We might contrast the pharmacist's advertisement, therefore, with
those forms of commercial communications that do not serve to underwrite a
public communicative sphere. A paradigmatic example might be communi-
cations that occur within "fiduciary, person-to-person relationships."'9
92. For attempted regulation of advertisements in newspapers, see, for example, 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1996). See generally Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Bates v. State Bar
of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
93. Post, supra note 37, at 1276.
94. Carroll D. Clark, Concept of the Public, 13 Sw. SOC. SCI. Q. 311, 313 (1933).
95. JOHN W. BENNETT & MELVIN M. TUMIN, SOCIAL LIFE: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION
140 (1948).
96. See Post, supra note 37, at 1276.
97. E.B. REUTER & C.W. HART, INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY 445 (1933).
98. See Post, Constitutional Concept, supra note 25, at 633-44, 672-76.
99. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 210 (1985).
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Although the communication between a professional and her client might
concern commercial matters, its regulation would almost certainly not be con-
ceptualized as an issue of First Amendment commercial speech doctrine. This
suggests that we should distinguish between "impersonal" communications
that sustain a public of independent strangers, and "personalized communi-
cations" that constitute particular relationships of dependence.'"
Such a distinction allows us to see that the Court's narrow focus on
"informational function"' ' is radically insufficient to define the First Amend-
ment category of commercial speech. In speaking with their clients, lawyers
undoubtedly convey information relevant to the exercise of citizenship, and
yet such communications would not normally come within the purview of
commercial speech doctrine. The doctrine seems to protect only the
distribution of commercial information that reinforces a public communi-
cative sphere by addressing strangers who are presumed to be independent
and self-possessed. The doctrine stops short of commercial communications
between persons deemed to be involved in relationships of dependence or
reliance.' 2
If we imagine the pharmacist's impersonal newspaper advertisements
and the lawyer's personal advice to her clients as the opposite poles of a
spectrum, we can perhaps envision how more difficult cases might be analyzed.
So, for example, consumer product safety warnings are distributed to the public
at large, but they are not regarded as commercial speech because consumers
100. Id.
101. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
102. For a discussion of these presumptions as thresholds to certain kinds of First Amend-
ment protection, see Post, supra note 37, at 1254-55. For an effort to draw this line, see the remarks
of Justice Byron White:
One who takes the affairs of a client personally in hand and purports to exercise judgment
on behalf of the client in the light of the client's individual needs and circumstances is
properly viewed as engaging in the practice of a profession. Just as offer and acceptance
are communications incidental to the regulable transaction called a contract, the
professional's speech is incidental to the conduct of the profession. If the government
enacts generally applicable licensing provisions limiting the class of persons who may
practice the profession, it cannot be said to have enacted a limitation on freedom of
speech or the press subject to First Amendment scrutiny. Where the personal nexus
between professional and client does not exist, and a speaker does not purport to be
exercising judgment on behalf of any particular individual with whose circumstances he
is directly acquainted, government regulation ceases to function as legitimate regulation
of professional practice with only incidental impact on speech; it becomes regulation of
speaking or publishing as such, subject to the First Amendment's command that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). For a good discussion, see
Halberstam, supra note 6, at 839-44.
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in such contexts are presumed to be dependent and justifiably reliant upon
the care of manufacturers.
103
By contrast, expression classified as commercial speech is sometimes
disseminated to particular persons, rather than to the public at large." 4 In
such contexts, however, the Court is careful to assure itself that the strangers
who are addressed by a solicitation are able to "assess the value of the informa-
tion presented"1"5 without the "dangers of compromised independence. '"106
The Court seeks to ascertain whether the circumstances of the solicitation
are "conducive to rational and considered decisionmaking. ' ' If the context
of an individualized solicitation is deemed inconsistent with rational independ-
ence, the Court will deprive the solicitation of the First Amendment pro-
tection of commercial speech doctrine, citing the possibility of "fraud, undue
~ ( ,1008influence, intimidation," or "overreaching.
We can thus see that implicit within commercial speech doctrine lies a
set of significant but largely unarticulated assumptions about the context in
which the Court will use the First Amendment to ensure that "the stream
of commercial information" flows "freely."'19 The Court will intervene only
when the stream of information flows among strangers who can be conceived
as independent and rational. We can interpret this as a constitutional
requirement that information must be dispersed under conditions that are
constitutive of a public communicative sphere.
When information is exchanged in circumstances that are deemed
inconsistent with this sphere, because persons are implicated in relation-
ships of dependence or reliance requiring legal protection, the Court has
not applied commercial speech doctrine. It has tended instead to regard the
exchange of information within such relationships as 'linked inextricably'
103. See, e.g., Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc., 727 F.2d 330, 338-39 (5th Cir. 1984);
Knaysi v. A.H. Robins Co., 679 F.2d 1366, 1369 (11th Cit. 1982).
104. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 763-64 (1993). Similarly, the Court will sometimes
regard as public discourse speech directed only at particular persons, as the Court's invocation of
"the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph" suggests, so long as the speech is
distributed in a way-as for example to strangers-that suggests its target to be the public at large.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972).
105. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767.
106. Id. at 772.
107. Id. at 775.
108. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978); see Edenfield, 507 U.S. at
775 (noting the danger of "uninformed acquiescence"); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466,
474 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985) (holding that
regulation is permissible to avoid "undue influence" or "pressure" that is not "conducive to reflection
and the exercise of choice").
109. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976);
see Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 768.
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with the commercial arrangement""' in which it occurs, so that regulation of
the arrangement can also restrict the speech by which the arrangement is
constituted.
1I. PROTECTING COMMERCIAL SPEECH
We can now formulate a somewhat more comprehensive account of the
First Amendment category of commercial speech. We can define it as the
set of communicative acts about commercial subjects that within a public
communicative sphere convey information of relevance to democratic
decision making but that do not themselves form part of public discourse.
This definition, in turn, should illuminate our consideration of Van
Alstyne's second question, which asks what difference it makes that a speech
act is classified as commercial speech. Constitutional protections for the
category of commercial speech ought to be explicable in terms of the con-
stitutional values the category is created to serve.
Commercial speech doctrine is a sprawling, complex, and contentious
area of jurisprudence, and it is certainly not my ambition to propose a
systematic reconstruction of its structure and rules. My hope instead is simply
to illustrate that many of the doctrinal rules that establish the subordinate
status of commercial speech can be explained by the difference between
valuing speech as a form of participation in public discourse, and valuing
speech merely for the information it conveys.
To find a path through this large and amorphous topic, I divide com-
mercial speech doctrine into two parts. First, I discuss rules articulated at the
very origins of commercial speech doctrine that describe the kinds of regu-
lations that may be imposed upon commercial speech, but not upon public
discourse. There are a number of such rules that have endured with stability
and resilience, but I shall discuss only three of them: those that (1)
empower states to compel disclosures within the domain of commercial
speech,"' (2) suspend overbreadth doctrine within the domain of com-
mercial speech,"2 and (3) suspend prior restraint doctrine within the domain
of commercial speech."' Second, I discuss the canonical standard used to
assess the constitutionality of regulations that are imposed upon commercial
110. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767 (quoting Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979)); see
Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 228-29 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
111. See Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
112. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380-81 (1977).
113. See Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
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speech. This is, of course, the controversial but still regnant multipart test first
set forth in 1980 in Central Hudson.
14
A. Rules that Subordinate Commercial Speech
1. Compelled Disclosures
The First Amendmeni ordinarily prohibits the state from regulations
that compel speech within public discourse. "5 The Court has observed that
"[t]here is certainly some difference between compelled speech and com-
pelled silence, but in the context of protected speech, the difference is
without constitutional significance, for the First Amendment guarantees
'freedom of speech,' a term necessarily comprising the decision of both what
to say and what not to say. ' ' . 6 The essential point is that "[miandating speech
that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of
the speech, ''" 7 and "[tihe First Amendment mandates that we presume that
speakers, not the government, know best both what they want to say and
how to say it."'' s
This rule does not apply, however, within the domain of commercial
speech. In Virginia Pharmacy the Court held that commercial speech could
be required to "include such additional information, warnings, and disclaim-
ers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive."'"9 And in Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel,' the Court upheld a state requirement that
attorney advertisements contain particular disclosures. The Court reasoned:
In requiring attorneys who advertise their willingness to represent
clients on a contingent-fee basis to state that the client may have to
bear certain expenses even if he loses, Ohio has not attempted to
prevent attorneys from conveying information to the public; it has
only required them to provide somewhat more information than they
might otherwise be inclined to present. We have, to be sure, held that
114. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
115. Such regulations are viewed as content based and hence subject "to exacting First
Amendment scrutiny." Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 798 (1988).
116. Id. at 796-97. In Riley the Court upheld its previous precedents to the effect that chari-
table solicitation was public discourse rather than commercial speech. See id. at 787-88. It therefore
struck down a state law mandating that professional charitable fund raisers disclose to potential
donors the average percentage of gross receipts actually turned over to charities. See id. at 803.
117. Id. at 795.
118. Id. at 790-91. For recent examples of the Court's prohibition of compelled speech, see
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 581 (1995),
and McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
119. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976).
120. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
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in some instances compulsion to speak may be as violative of the
First Amendment as prohibitions on speech....
.. Ohio has not attempted to "prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." The State has
attempted only to prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial
advertising, and its prescription has taken the form of a requirement
that appellant include in his advertising purely factual and uncon-
troversial information about the terms under which his services will
be available. Because the extension of First Amendment protection to
commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers
of the information such speech provides, appellant's constitutionally
protected interest in not providing any particular factual information
in his advertising is minimal.
... [W]e hold that an advertiser's rights are adequately protected
as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's
interest in preventing deception of consumers."
The doctrinal discrepancy between public discourse and commercial
speech could not be sharper. But what explains this discrepancy? The First
Amendment strongly disfavors compelled disclosure requirements within
public discourse because such requirements are understood to infringe the
autonomy of speakers in determining the content of their speech. Disclosure
requirements are permissible within the domain of commercial speech,
however, because the autonomy of speakers is not at stake, only the
conveyance of information. Hence commercial speech doctrine accords
only "minimal" value to the interests of speakers "in not providing any
particular factual information."
The doctrinal discrepancy between public discourse and commercial
speech accurately reflects the distinct First Amendment values that are
understood to be at stake in these two different forms of speech. Public
discourse is where citizens attempt to render the state responsive to their views,
and hence where individual and collective self-determination is reconciled." '
In such circumstances, compulsory speech disrupts the very point of public
discourse, for it threatens to compromise "the values lying at the 'heart of
the First Amendment the notion that an individual should be free to believe
as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his
mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State."""
121. Id. at 650-51 (citations omitted) (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943)).
122. See Post, supra note 11, at 173.
123. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 472 (1997) (quoting Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 204, 234-35 (1977)).
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Within commercial speech, by contrast, the primary constitutional value
concerns the circulation of accurate and useful information. For the state
to mandate disclosures designed more fully and completely to convey infor-
mation is thus to advance, rather than to contradict, pertinent constitu-
tional values.
2. Overbreadth Doctrine
State regulations of public discourse are subject to overbreadth analysis,
but "the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine does not apply to" com-
mercial speech.124 This is an important point of difference, but its significance
is somewhat obscured by the fact that overbreadth analysis itself is so various
and ambiguous.
It is sufficient for our purposes to distinguish between two different mean-
ings of overbreadth doctrine. First, overbreadth can refer to the form of a legal
rule. To say that a legal rule is overbroad is to say that it is overinclusive,
that its provisions regulate more behavior than can or should. strictly be
regulated."5 We use the term "overbreadth" in this way whenever we speak
of "overbroad statute[s]."'26
Second, overbreadth can refer to the ability of a person to strike down
a statute on its face, even if the statute's specific application to him might be
constitutional. Overbreadth in this sense is often referred to as a doctrine
of third-party standing designed to avoid the chilling effect that might
occur when a statute is unconstitutional in many of its applications but is
without proper plaintiffs to challenge it.'27 I separately discuss each of these
meanings of the overbreadth doctrine.
124. Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 478 (1988) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion);
accord Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481 (1989); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 462 n.20 (1978).
125. For examples of this usage, see Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 586-88 (1989)
(Scalia, J., plurality opinion), and Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491,503 (1985).
126. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 118-19 (1990); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350, 380 (1977); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975).
127. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-13 (1973). There is also a third meaning
of overbreadth doctrine, which refers to the actual operation of a legal rule. To say that a legal
rule is overbroad in this sense is to say that, regardless of its precise drafting, its actual effect is to
inhibit the exercise of otherwise protected First Amendment freedoms. Justice William Brennan
coined the term "overbreadth" in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963), to describe just
this kind of situation. It is not, however, pertinent to our consideration of commercial speech
doctrine, and so I have omitted it.
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a. Overbreadth as Overinclusiveness
Overbreadth in the sense of overinclusiveness concerns the question of
how narrowly tailored a legal rule must be. Overinclusiveness is a matter of
degree, and the Court has made clear that it is prepared to accept greater
overinclusiveness in the domain of commercial speech than in the arena of
public discourse. Within public discourse, the Court has said that "[pirecision
of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most
precious freedoms. 1 21 Considerably greater latitude is allowed within the
domain of commercial speech, however, where it is said that "[w]hat our
decisions require is a 'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means
chosen to accomplish those ends, a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but
reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but
one whose scope is 'in proportion to the interests served.' 129
The contrast between the two standards can be seen by comparing the
Court's judgments in two cases decided on the same day: Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Association'3° and In re Primus.' In Ohralik, the Court upheld a broad
prophylactic ban on in-person solicitation by lawyers.32 It noted that the ban
was justified by inherent dangers of overreaching and undue influence, and
it held that the ban could be applied to a particular lawyer even though the
state had not demonstrated that the lawyer had himself engaged in any such
misconduct.' In Primus, by contrast, the Court held that in-person solici-
tation of public interest litigation by an American Civil Liberties Union
128. Button, 371 U.S. at 438.
129. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (citations omitted) (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
There is actually a great deal of play in the joints about how overinclusive a legal regulation may
be in the area of commercial speech. Compare Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 769 (1993), and
Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91,107 (1990) (Stevens., J.), and
Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476, and Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 649
(1985), with Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464.
130. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
131. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
132. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464.
133. See id. at 465-70. The lawyer argued "that nothing less than actual proved harm to the
solicited individual would be a sufficiently important state interest to justify disciplining the
attorney who solicits employment in person for pecuniary gain." Id: at 464. But the Court said
that the lawyer's "argument misconceives the nature of the State's interest." Id.
The Rules prohibiting solicitation are prophylactic measures whose objective is the prevention
of harm before it occurs. The Rules were applied in this case to discipline a lawyer for
soliciting employment for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to result in the
adverse consequences the State seeks to avert. In such a situation, which is inherently
conducive to overreaching and other forms of misconduct, the State has a strong interest
in adopting and enforcing rules of conduct designed to protect the public from harmful
solicitation by lawyers whom it has licensed.
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lawyer was to be regarded as public discourse, rather than as commercial
speech, and hence that it could not be regulated by such an overbroad rule.
The approach we adopt today in Ohralik, that the State may proscribe
in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely
to result in adverse consequences, cannot be applied to appellant's
activity on behalf of the ACLU.
At bottom, the case against appellant rests on the proposition that
a State may regulate in a prophylactic fashion all solicitation
activities of lawyers because there may be some potential for
overreaching... whenever a lawyer gives unsolicited advice and
communicates an offer of representation to a layman. Under certain
circumstances, that approach is appropriate in the case of speech that
simply "propose[s] a commercial transaction." In the context of political
expression and association, however, a State must regulate with
significantly greater precision.134
Notice that the state's interest in protecting clients is exactly the same in
Ohralik and in Primus. Because the significance of the state's interest is held
constant, the distinction between the degree of overinclusiveness allowed
by the two cases must reflect a difference in the constitutional value of the
speech that the state seeks to regulate. A Meiklejohnian model of the First
Amendment cannot explain this difference, for it regards all speech as
constitutionally valuable because of the information it provides for public
decision making. We need instead a theory of the First Amendment capable
of recognizing that public discourse implicates different constitutional values
than does commercial speech.
I have already suggested that the participatory model of self-governance
offers such an account, because it allows us to see that public discourse
exemplifies the constitutional value of democratic legitimation, while commer-
cial speech does not. Both public discourse and commercial speech convey
information relevant to democratic decision making, but because public
discourse is also a venue of democratic participation, overinclusive statutes
do more constitutional damage when applied to public discourse than when
134. Primus, 436 U.S. at 434, 437-38 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). It should be
noted, however, that within public discourse the Court has only required "precision" of regulation
for legal rules that are content based. Content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations are
permitted approximately the same degree of overinclusiveness as are regulations of commercial
speech. See Fox, 492 U.S. at 477-78; Post, supra note 37, at 1260-63. But regulations of commer-
cial speech are characteristically content based, and so, like the regulation at issue in Ohralik, tend
to be too imprecise to withstand the strict scrutiny they would receive were they to be imposed
upon public discourse.
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applied to commercial speech. Applied to public discourse, overinclusive
statutes endanger the precious and fragile value of democratic engagement.
This value is not at risk in the regulation of commercial speech.
b. Overbreadth as Third-Party Standing
The doctrine of overbreadth refers not only to the overinclusiveness of
legal rules, but also to the question of whether "a party whose own conduct
is not protected by the First Amendment" can "challenge a regulation as"
overinclusive "because of its impact on parties not before the Court."'35 The
justification for this branch of overbreadth doctrine is that an overinclusive
statute
might serve to chill protected speech. First Amendment interests are
fragile interests, and a person who contemplates protected activity
might be discouraged by the in terrorem effect of the statute.... The
use of overbreadth analysis reflects the conclusion that the possible
harm to society from allowing unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that protected speech will be muted.'36
This aspect of overbreadth doctrine, which might be termed overbreadth
standing analysis, is said to be categorically inapplicable to commercial
speech.'37 The reason given by the Court for this exclusion is that "commer-
cial speech may be more durable than other kinds. Since advertising is the
sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood of its being
chilled by proper regulation and foregone entirely."'3 "[Clommercial speech
is more hardy, less likely to be 'chilled,' and not in need of surrogate
litigators."' 9
This reasoning relies upon an empirical account of the actual durability
of commercial speech, an account that does "not survive close examination."'
Many forms of public discourse are fueled by an intense and hardy search for
profits: motion pictures, books, magazines, and newspapers, to mention only
135. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 107 n.15 (1990)
(Stevens., J.). For a typical example of confusion between the two senses of overbreadth, see id. at
118-19 (White, J., dissenting).
136. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977).
137. See id.
138. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976);
see Bates, 433 U.S. at 381 ("Since advertising is linked to commercial well-being, it seems unlikely
that such speech is particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation.").
139. Fox, 492 U.S. at 481. "Commercial speech is not as likely to be deterred as noncommer-
cial speech, and therefore does not require the added protection afforded by the overbreadth
approach." Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 441,462 n.20 (1978); see Friedman v. Rogers,
440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979).
140. Farber, supra note 20, at 385-86.
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a few."' The chilling effect of regulation, moreover, "depends as much on the
potential penalty as on the motivation for the speech. A five dollar fine in a
political speech case is probably less of a deterrent than a jail sentence--or
disbarment-in a commercial speech case.' 42
At most, therefore, it might be argued that commercial speech is perhaps
relatively less likely to be chilled than public discourse, and the empirical
basis of even such a tepid generalization is quite shaky. The argument certainly
does not justify a rule that categorically forbids applying overbreadth standing
analysis to commercial speech. It is more plausible to understand the categori-
cal nature of this exclusion as expressing the perspective that we have
already applied to the overinclusiveness branch of overbreadth doctrine.
Overbreadth standing analysis is categorically excluded from commercial
speech doctrine because of the constitutional quality of the speech that might
be chilled, rather than because of its empirical quantity.
To chill commercial speech is to lose information. No other con-
stitutional value is at stake. Information is fungible. The central insight of
Meiklejohnian analysis is that it does not matter which speaker provides
information, so long as it is provided. If a particular speaker is chilled,
therefore, it is quite possible that equivalent information will become avail-
able from other sources.
If public discourse is chilled, by contrast, not only is information lost,
but also the possibility of democratic legitimation. Democratic legitimation is
not fungible; it is earned, speaker by speaker. A person whose participation
within public discourse has been chilled has by hypothesis become that
much more alienated from the state. This important difference might well
explain why the Court categorically applies overbreadth standing analysis to
public discourse, but not to commercial speech.
1. Prior Restraint Doctrine
There are heavy presumptions against imposing prior restraints upon
public discourse.' But in Virginia Pharmacy, Justice Blackmun specifically
notes that these presumptions might be "inapplicable" to commercial speech.'"
In Central Hudson, the Court even recommends a system of prior restraints
as an acceptable method of regulating commercial speech.'45 The Court thus
141. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 3, at 637.
142. Farber, supra note 20, at 386.
143. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Org. for a Better Austin
v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
144. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24
(1976); see Friedman, 440 U.S. at 10.
145. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 571 (1980).
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seems to have created a doctrinal structure in which prior restraints are
presumptively unconstitutional within public discourse, but presumptively
constitutional for commercial speech.
A difficulty in explaining this discrepancy lies in the knotted and ambigu-
ous nature of prior restraint doctrine, for it is hard to ascertain exactly what
values the doctrine is meant to serve.'46 A plausible account, however, is
offered by the Court in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations,'47 in which the Court asserts that "[the special vice of a prior
restraint is that communication will be suppressed, either directly or by
inducing excessive caution in the speaker, before an adequate determina-
tion that it is unprotected by the First Amendment."'48
Although this reasoning cannot begin to provide a full explanation of
the entire range of prior restraint doctrine,'49 it does seem pertinent to the
Court's refusal to apply the doctrine to the area of commercial speech. The
Court has explicitly remarked that "[wie have observed that commercial
speech is, such a sturdy brand of expression that traditional prior restraint
doctrine may not apply to it."' 0 We can thus interpret the Court's refusal to
apply prior restraint doctrine to commercial speech as resting on the notion
that commercial speech is too durable to be chilled by prior restraints.
If this is the Court's reasoning, the same explanation that we have
already articulated with regard to overbreadth standing analysis applies to
prior restraint doctrine. The empirical assertion that commercial speech is
more sturdy than public discourse is suspect, but the chilling of public
discourse poses distinctive and more significant threats to central con-
stitutional values than does the chilling of commercial speech. The differ-
ential application of prior restraint doctrine, therefore, expresses the
constitutional distinction between communication valued only as informp-
tion and communication valued as constitutive of democratic self-government.
146. See, e.g., Stephen R. Bamett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539 (1977);
Vince Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1482 (1970); Vincent Blasi,
Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11 (1981); John Calvin
Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409 (1983); Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role
of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53 (1984).
147. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
148. Id. at 390.
149. In a case like New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), for example, the
proposed injunction of the Court could not possibly have resulted in a chilling effect, because the
injunction would have extended only to specific materials before the Court, as to which a full
judicial examination had already been conducted. Yet the proposed injunction was regarded as a
disfavored prior restraint.
150. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 571 n.13.
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B. The Central Hudson Test
After a period of much controversy, the Court in 1980 in Central Hudson
articulated a general test for determining the constitutionality of regulations
of commercial speech.'5' Although the test has subsequently been interpreted
from radically different perspectives, 52 and although it has been attacked by
numerous justices, 3 it has nevertheless remained the dominant test.' The
test provides:
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed.
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected
by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be mislead-
ing. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to
serve that interest.1
55
The Central Hudson test can be divided into two parts. The first part of
the test articulates threshold conditions for the application of First Amend-
ment protections. The second part of the test enunciates the nature of these
protections. I discuss each of these parts separately. My concern is to explore
how the various aspects of the Central Hudson test can best be interpreted
to reflect the underlying First Amendment theory that justifies constitutional
protections for commercial speech.
1. The Threshold Requirements
The Central Hudson test imposes two threshold requirements before
commercial speech can receive First Amendment protection. The speech must
concern lawful activity, and it must not be misleading.
In this brief Lecture I do not discuss the requirement of lawful activity.
Within public discourse, the advocacy of illegal actions cannot be sanctioned
"except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
151. See id. at 566.
152. Compare, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986), with Rubin
v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995). See Matthew Miller, The First Amendment and Legislative
Bans of Liquor and Cigarette Advertisements, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 632, 633-35 (1985); Brian J. Waters,
Comment, A Doctrine in Disarray: Why the First Amendment Demands the Abandonment of the Central
Hudson Test for Commercial Speech, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1626, 1628 (1997).
153. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 523-28 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
154. See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999).
155. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
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lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.'' 56 In an early
case, the Court actually used this test to shield commercial speech from regu-
lation on the ground that it advertised potentially illegal action.'57 But the
Central Hudson test has since drawn a bright line between commercial
speech and public discourse with regard to speech connected to illegal action.
Some have argued that this line is illusory, because soliciting illegal
action is flatly unprotected even within public discourse.' But there does
seem to be an important difference between advocating illegal action and
soliciting illegal action, and much commercial speech would appear closer
to the former than the latter. Apart from stressing the obvious (and to me
significant) constitutional difference between penalizing the dissemination
of information about illegal acts and penalizing participation in the process
of democratic self-governance because of a possible connection to illegal acts,
however, I observe only that this is a dense and obscure area that is best left
to another day.
Instead I focus on the threshold requirement that commercial speech
cannot receive First Amendment protection if it is "misleading.'"5 9 To
analyze this requirement, we must distinguish speech that is factually false
from speech that is merely misleading. With respect to false speech, the
Court has stated that "there is no constitutional value in false statements of
fact. '" ° Although the dissemination of false facts within public discourse is
most often protected in order to avoid chilling the communication of otherwise
protected speech, 6' the Court has refused to apply this kind of chilling
analysis to commercial speech.'62 The lack of constitutional protection for
false statements of fact has consequently had more dramatic effects in the
realm of commercial speech.
Of much greater theoretical importance, however, is the distinction
between commercial speech and public discourse with regard to the regu-
lation of misleading speech. Within the area of public discourse, the Court has
156. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). For a discussion of Brandenburg, see
KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE (1989), and Larry Alexander,
Incitement and Freedom of Speech, in FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND INCITEMENT AGAINST DEMOCRACY
101 (David Kretzmer & Francine Kershman Hazan eds., 2000).
157. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977).
158. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 3, at 152.
159. "[Flalse, deceptive, or misleading commercial speech may be banned." Ibanez v. Fla.
Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 512 U.S. 36, 142 (1994).
160. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
161. See, e.g., St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968); N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279, 283 (1964).
162. See supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text.
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been clear that "there is no such thing as a false idea. 163  But under the
Central Hudson test, misleading commercial speech does not merit any First
Amendment protection at all."' This is said to be because "'[t]he First
Amendment... does not prohibit the State from insuring that the stream
of commercial information flow[s] cleanly as well as freely.'
1 65
Withholding First Amendment protection from misleading speech
appears on its face inconsistent with the Meiklejohnian theory that justifies
constitutional protection for commercial speech. Meiklejohn famously
believed that there was an "equality of status in the field of ideas."'66 Imagine,
for example, the moderator at a Meiklejohnian town meeting ruling a speaker
out of order because his ideas were "misleading." Meiklejohn would have been
appalled:
When men govern themselves, it is they-and no one else-who
must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and danger. And
that means that unwise ideas must have a hearing as well as wise ones,
unfair as well as fair, dangerous as well as safe, un-American as well
as American. Just so far as, at any point, the citizens who are to decide
an issue are denied acquaintance with information or opinion or
doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far
the result must be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general
good. 167
The threshold requirement that commercial speech not be misleading
is especially striking because the Court's justification for it is so very weak.
The Court has sought to explain the requirement on the grounds that "[t]he
truth of commercial speech ... may be more easily verifiable by its dissemi-
163. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339; see, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 598 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
[I]n the world of political advocacy and its marketplace of ideas, there is no such thing as a
"fraudulent" idea: there may be useless proposals, totally unworkable schemes, as well as
very sound proposals that will receive the imprimatur of the "marketplace of ideas" through
our majoritarian system of election and representative government.
Id.; see Shiffrin, supra note 20, at 1231.
164. See, e.g., Inre R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the First
Amendment. But when the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that
it is inherently misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such advertising is
subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restrictions. Misleading advertising
may be prohibited entirely. But the States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain
types of potentially misleading information ... if the information also may be presented
in a way that is not deceptive.
Id. at 203.
165. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-72 (1976)).
166. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 53, at 27.
167. Id.
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nator than, let us say, news reporting or political commentary, in that
ordinarily the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific
product or service that he himself provides and presumably knows more
about than anyone else."'68 But this explanation, like the hypothetical dura-
bility that the Court has attributed to commercial speech, has been persua-
sively criticized.
Putting aside outright false communications, the difficulties of iden-
tifying misleading statements seem as formidable in the area of commercial
speech as in the arena of public discourse.' Indeed, the Court has itself
acknowledged as much.
A brief survey of the body of case law that has developed as a result
of the Federal Trade Commission's efforts to carry out its mandate
under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to eliminate "unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in... commerce," reveals that dis-
tinguishing deceptive from nondeceptive advertising in virtually any
field of commerce may require resolution of exceedingly complex and




Especially in an age of "product-image and product-personality advertising,''
the notion that commercial speech is any more verifiable than public
discourse has a rather quaint air about it, as though nostalgic for an era before
"advertising entered the twentieth century."'' 2
Stripped of this unconvincing justification, the withholding of First
Amendment protection from misleading commercial speech appears puzzling,
because it seems inconsistent with the very theory articulated by the Court
to justify constitutionally protecting commercial speech. The Court has,
however, used the Central Hudson test's misleading requirement in two dis-
tinct ways, and at least one of these can be rendered compatible with the
Meiklejohnian foundations of commercial speech doctrine.
168. Va. Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24; see Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476
(1995).
Most of the time, if a seller is representing a fact or making a prediction about his
product, the seller will know whether his statements are false or misleading and he will
be able to correct them. On the other hand, the purveyor of political speech is more
often... an observer who is in a poor position to verify its truth.
Id. at 495 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
169. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 20, at 385-86.
170. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 645 (1985) (citation omitted).
171. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71 TEX. L. REV.
697, 702 (1993).
172. Kozinski & Banner, supra note 3, at 635. How, for example, might the misleading quality
of "the claim that Burger King's hamburgers taste better than McDonalds' because they are char-
broiled" be evaluated? Id.
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Meiklejohn imagined the town meeting as an assembly "of free and
equal men.""17 Implicit within the public communicative sphere, which defines
the limits of commercial speech, are similar presuppositions.' There are
many social settings, however, in which persons are neither equal nor free,
but rather unequal and dependent. A paradigmatic example might be the
reliance of a patient upon the advice of his doctor. The Court has sometimes
used the misleading requirement to identify such circumstances and to
deprive them of the constitutional protection of commercial speech doctrine
on the grounds that they "pose dangers that the State has a right to prevent,"
like "uninformed acquiescence."'7
Used in this way, the misleading requirement refers not to the content
of speech, but to the structural relationship between a speaker and her
audience. Thus the Court has used the requirement to distinguish between
"in-person solicitation" and "print advertising," holding that the latter "poses
much less risk of overreaching or undue influence" because it is "more con-
ducive to reflection and the exercise of choice on the part of the consumer
than is personal solicitation. ,176 In this context, the misleading requirement
articulates the prerequisites for the public communicative sphere that under-
writes the very constitutional category of commercial speech. It is therefore
appropriate to use the requirement as a threshold precondition for First
Amendment protection under the Central Hudson test.
But the Court has sometimes deployed the misleading requirement in a
second and altogether different manner. The Court has interpreted the
requirement to refer to the content of commercial speech that is unambi-
guously disseminated within the public communicative sphere, as for example
within newspaper advertisements. Used in this way, the misleading
requirement does not refer to the structural relationship between a speaker
and her audience, but to the meaning of a speaker's words.'78 The require-
ment strips of First Amendment protection speech that, while not outright
false, carries the potential to deceive its audience.'79 This usage of the mis-
173. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 53, at 25.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 92-98.
175. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 774-75 (1993); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447, 465 (1978); supra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
176. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985); see Shapero v. Ky.
Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 475 (1988) ("In assessing the potential for overreaching and undue
influence, the mode of communication makes all the difference.").
177. See, e.g., Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652-53.
178. Hence the Court stated in In re R.M.J. that the First Amendment would not protect
commercial speech when its "particular content or method ... suggests that it is inherently mis-
leading." In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (emphasis added).
179. It should be said about this usage of the misleading requirement that, although the Court
has been careful not to impugn administrative authority to review commercial speech for deceptive
HeinOnline -- 48 UCLA L. Rev. 38 2000-2001
The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech 39
leading requirement is controversial,"'0 but nevertheless enormously signifi-
cant, for it authorizes a "vast regulatory apparatus in both the federal govern-
ment and the states ... to control ... potentially misleading or deceptive
speech.....
It is all the more important, therefore, fully to grasp the deep incom-
patibility between this interpretation of the misleading requirement and the
Meiklejohnian justifications for First Amendment protection of commercial
speech. "Just so far as... the citizens who are to decide an issue are denied
acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism
which is relevant to that issue," Meiklejohn writes, "just so far the result must
be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the general good. It is that
mutilation of the thinking process of the community against which the First
Amendment to the Constitution is directed."' 2  When the Central Hudson
misleading requirement is used to censor the content of speech, it invites
the state to mutilate the thinking process of the community by censoring
communication that the state believes might potentially be deceptive.
To analyze this issue, we must more precisely specify what it means to
label speech as misleading. If a health reformer were to publish an essay con-
cluding that "eggs are healthy," ' 3 the assertion would without doubt be viewed
as part of public discourse and protected as a hypothesis, an idea that cannot
be sanctioned by the state as false. But if a commercial group, the National
Commission on Egg Nutrition, were to assert precisely the same proposition,
meanings, see Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 645, it has itself been quite chary of using the Central Hudson
misleading requirement to deprive commercial speech of constitutional protection on the grounds
of its content. Early in the career of the doctrine, the Court found the use of a trade name that
had "no intrinsic meaning" to be deceptive, Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12-13, (1979), and it
later authorized compelled disclosures in order to avoid "the possibility of deception." Zauderer, 471
U.S. at 652. But for the most part the Court has been unsympathetic to claims that commercial
speech is misleading, rejecting '"mere speculation or conjecture" and insisting that "the State 'must
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real."' Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation,
512 U.S. 141,143 (1994) (quoting Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770-71).
180. In Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission, 496 U.S. 91 (1990), the Court
fractured over the issue of deceptive advertising, with the decisive votes of Justices Thurgood
Marshall and Brennan standing for the conclusion that "States may prohibit actually or inherently
misleading speech entirely.... The Court has upheld such a ban only when the particular method
by which the information is imparted to consumers is inherently conducive to deception and
coercion." Id. at 111-12 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Citing Ohralik, Marshall
and Brennan would seem to advocate restricting the "misleading" requirement to circumstances
where the relationship between a speaker and her audience does not meet the prerequisites of a
public communicative sphere. They seem to argue that within the public communicative sphere
the state cannot ban commercial speech outright, but only craft regulations designed "to ensure
that the information is presented in a nonmisleading manner." Id. at 111.
181. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 153.
182. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 53, at 27.
183. This hypothetical is based upon National Commission on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d
157 (7th Cir. 1977), and the discussion of the case in Kozinski & Banner, supra note 3, at 642-43.
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the statement might very well be branded as misleading and hence stripped
of First Amendment protection under Central Hudson. It would be feared
that consumers might interpret the statement as a simple and inaccurate factual
claim.
In the case of the health reformer, the focus of analysis is on the speaker.
The distinction between "ideas" and "factual statements" is interpreted so
as to maximize the speaker's freedom of participation within public
discourse." In the case of the National Commission on Egg Nutrition, by
contrast, the focus of analysis is on the audience. The Commission's speech
is entirely circumscribed by the danger that its audience might possibly
misinterpret its words. These discrepant foci of analysis are roughly what one
would expect from the distinct orientations of the participatory and
Meiklejohnian models of self-governance.
The Meiklejohnian model, however, requires ds to imagine the audience
for protected speech as analogous to citizens at a town meeting. Meiklejohn
would have us safeguard the flow of information to the "free and equal"
persons "who must pass judgment upon unwisdom and unfairness and dan-
ger."'' s But when used to regulate the content of expression, the misleading
requirement does not imagine the audience of commercial speech as inde-
pendent and self-governing in these ways. Instead, as Kathleen Sullivan has
perceptively noted, "the consumer is not expected to have the competence or
access to information needed to question the advertiser's claim, and the
correction is not to be left to competitors and mere government counter-
speech."'86 The Court has frankly acknowledged that the misleading require-
ment is premised on the notion that "the public lacks sophistication."''
This is why the Central Hudson misleading requirement, when used to
prohibit commercial speech based upon the content of that speech, is incom-
patible with the Meiklejohnian premises that justify protecting commercial
speech."' Incompatibility exists to the extent that the Court interprets the
184. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290 (1971) (distinguishing between inter-
pretations and factual assertions).
185. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 53, at 25, 27.
186. Sullivan, supra note 3, at 156; see United States v. Articles of Drugs, 263 F. Supp. 212,
215 (D. Neb. 1967).
187. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200 (1982) (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383
(1977)). But see Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 105 (1990)
(Stevens, J., plurality opinion) ("We reject the paternalistic assumption that the recipients of
petitioner's letterhead are no more discriminating than the audience for children's television.").
188. Notice that this tension does not extend to the Court's rule that commercial speech
that is only "potentially misleading" may be required to be supplemented by compelled disclosures so
as to offer more complete and accurate information. See R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203. Supplementation
of speech is consistent with a Meiklejohnian model, because it increases the information available
to democratic decision makers.
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category of misleading speech more expansively than the category of false
factual statements, which can be regulated consistently with a Meiklejohnian
model. And this discrepancy can be precisely measured by the Court's
willingness to attribute to consumers an inadequate ability to interpret and
evaluate ambiguous information. Such attribution suggests that the Court
has not been able entirely to transcend older images of consumers as
vulnerable and reliant, images that underlay the Court's earlier refusal to
extend any First Amendment protection to commercial speech.'
For this reason, Central Hudson's use of the misleading requirement as
a threshold precondition for First Amendment protection cannot, without
internal contradiction, be premised upon the content of speech. The con-
tradiction can be resolved only by redefining the misleading requirement to
focus on the specific conditions that might be understood to render consumers
dependent and vulnerable. The Court might conclude, for example, that
state protections are necessary when the evaluation of commercial infor-
mation requires unusual expertise' or when there are reasons to doubt the
autonomy of consumers. 9' Such an approach would shift judicial attention
away from the content of particular communications and instead direct
judicial scrutiny to the structural preconditions of consumer rationality and
independence.
This approach would essentially align the Central Hudson misleading
requirement with the first interpretation we have discussed. It would use the
requirement to determine the boundaries of a public communicative sphere.
It would not define these boundaries exclusively in terms of "the particular
method by which ... information is imparted to consumers,"'92 but would
instead invite the Court to offer a more discriminating and nuanced account
of the circumstances under which consumers are constitutionally to be regarded
as free and equal citizens. The implication of such an approach, however, is
that it would be unconstitutional for the state to suppress the content of com-
mercial speech as misleading in structural conditions where consumers are
deemed to be independent and competent."'
189. Justice William H. Rehnquist saw this very clearly when, objecting to the very creation
of commercial speech doctrine, he argued that consumers, unlike citizens, cannot be trusted to
know their own interests. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 593 n.5 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
190. See, e.g., R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 200. 1 owe to Eugene Volokh the suggestion that the Court
might even regard consumers as vulnerable when an adequate understanding of commercial speech
would require more time and resources than the average consumer could reasonably be asked to
invest.
191. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Addiction, Autonomy, and Advertising, 77 IOWA L. REv. 909 (1992).
192. Peel, 496 U.S. at 112 (Marshall, J., concurring).
193. Outright fraud would remain subject to legal control, because falsity remains an element
of the tort. See Soules v. Gen. Motors Corp., 402 N.E.2d 599, 601 (III. 1980).
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2. First Amendment Protections
Once the threshold conditions of the Central Hudson test are satisfied, its
remaining three prongs articulate the First Amendment safeguards to which
commercial speech is entitled. These safeguards are astonishingly abstract.
To survive First Amendment review, the state need only craft regulations
that directly advance a substantial interest in a manner that is not too over-
inclusive; that is, in a manner "whose scope is 'in proportion to the interest
served.'
194
The bland, generic quality of these requirements is unconnected to
any particular First Amendment theory, which is no doubt why they have
proved susceptible to such wide swings of application. In 1986, Justice
Rehnquist was able to convince the Court to apply the test in so deferential a
manner as to virtually strip commercial speech of all constitutional pro-
tection.195 But recently the Central Hudson test has been applied with a severity
that borders on strict scrutiny.'96 These extraordinary oscillations exemplify
the essential difficulty of contemporary commercial speech doctrine, which
is that its major doctrinal test remains untethered to any particular First
Amendment theory.
Doctrine fulfills its function when it accurately accomplishes the pur-
poses of the law. If I am correct that the purpose of protecting commercial
speech is to realize the constitutional values articulated in a Meiklejohnian
vision of democratic self-government, then commercial speech doctrine
ought to articulate and apply those values. Although the specific doctrinal
rules applied to commercial speech regarding compelled disclosure, over-
breadth, and prior restraints, do roughly express the implications of a
194. Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (quoting R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203).
195. See Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986). Justice Rehnquist
had previously and conspicuously taken the position that commercial speech doctrine was a mistake,
and that commercial speech should not receive any constitutional protection. See Cent. Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S., 557, 588-99 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
in part); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 404 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Va. State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 781-90 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). In Posadas he crafted an opinion that in effect achieved this same result. He argued that
"it is precisely because the government could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of the
underlying conduct that it is permissible for the government to take the less intrusive step of
allowing the conduct, but reducing the demand through restrictions on advertising." Posadas, 478
U.S. at 346. By concluding that the power to regulate conduct necessarily implied the power to
regulate commercial speech that advertised the conduct, Rehnquist effectively reduced First Amend-
ment protections of commercial speech to the due process safeguards for the conduct the commercial
speech sought to advertise. It is remarkable that after a decade of commercial speech decisions,
Rehnquist was able to assemble a Court for this approach.
196. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 528 (1996) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Sullivan, supra note 3, at 141-45.
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Meiklejohnian vision, the Central Hudson test does not. As a consequence,
important aspects of the doctrine have been left to twist slowly in the wind.
The relationship of First Amendment doctrine to constitutional
objectives ought to be assessed in two distinct dimensions. The first is that
of government purpose. A useful doctrine ought to distinguish government
interests that are compatible with relevant constitutional values from those
that are not. The second is that of impact. A useful doctrine ought to distin-
guish effects on speech that are compatible with relevant constitutional
values from those that are not.
a. The Central Hudson Test and the Purpose
of Government Regulations
The Central Hudson test asks whether government interests in regu-
lating commercial speech are substantial. We can read this as a rough way
of saying that the informational function of commercial speech ought to be
compromised only if there is a pretty good reason to do so. This may be an
acceptable starting point for analysis, but doctrine ought to do more. It ought
to ask whether government purposes are consistent or inconsistent with perti-
nent constitutional values. The Central Hudson test pointedly avoids this
inquiry.
A careful elaboration of a Meiklejohnian perspective, however, would
rule out certain government purposes as prima facie inappropriate. It should
be regarded as improper for the government to regulate commercial speech
in order to affect governmental decision making. A prohibition on advertise-
ments of Nazi memorabilia, for example, should be prima facie unacceptable
if enacted for the purpose of preventing persons from voting in ways influ-
enced by Nazi ideas.' 97 For similar reasons, it should be regarded as presump-
tively improper for the government to regulate commercial speech in order
to influence the formation of public opinion with regard to particular con-
ceptions of national identity.! s A prohibition on advertisements of attractive
cars, for example, should be unacceptable if enacted for the purpose of
manipulating public opinion in favor of mass transportation.
Typically, however, the government does not prohibit advertising in
order to influence political decision making or public opinion, but instead to
197. In the end, of course, we might permit the government to advance inappropriate purposes,
if the stakes in doing so were sufficiently high. It is not the function of doctrine to place the state
in a suicidal straitjacket, but instead to identify the particular circumstances in which the state must
meet very high thresholds of justification, akin to strict scrutiny, before it can act.
198. For a fuller development of this point, see Post, Meildejohn's Mistake, supra note 25, at
1116-17.
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regulate consumer behavior. A government will ban "for sale" signs to dis-
courage home sales so as to preserve racially integrated neighborhoods under
threat of blockbusting,1 99 or it will bar energy advertisements in order to
promote conservation,' °° or it will proscribe casino or liquor advertisements
in order to ameliorate the evils of gambling or drinking. °1 In recent years,
these forms of regulation have become deeply controversial, so much so that
they threaten to unravel the Central Hudson test itself.
Justice Blackmun in fact dissented from Central Hudson because he
believed that it should be presumptively improper for the state to attempt
to modify behavior by suppressing truthful commercial information. He
argued that "a strict standard of review" should apply "to suppression of com-
mercial information, where the purpose of the restraint is to influence behavior
by depriving citizens of information."202 Subsequently Justice Clarence Thomas
has written forcefully that the Central Hudson test ought not to be applied to
situations in which "the asserted interest is one that is to be achieved through
keeping would-be recipients of the speech in the dark."2 3 And Justice John
Paul Stevens has also argued strongly against the Central Hudson test,
because "[tihe First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regula-
tions that seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives
to be their own good." ' 4
There are (at least) three distinct reasons for this growing opposition to
state suppression of truthful advertising in order to modify behavior. These
are (1) ambiguity concerning the purpose of commercial speech doctrine,
(2) the conflation of commercial speech and public discourse, and (3)
hostility to paternalism. Each of these reasons contributes to the centrifugal
pressure currently tearing at the fabric of commercial speech doctrine.
199. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977).
200. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568.
201. See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986); 44 Liquormart,
517 U.S. 484.
202. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 577 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
203. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 523 (Thomas, J., concurring). In Greater New Orleans
Broadcasting Ass'n v. United States, Justice Thomas concurred specially to reiterate his view that "In
cases such as this, in which the government's asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or
service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace," the Central Hudson test
should not be applied because "such an 'interest' is per se illegitimate and can no more justify
regulation of 'commercial' speech than it can justify regulation of 'noncommercial' speech."
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999) (quoting 44
Liquorrnart, 517 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J. concurring)). Justice Thomas, however, has joined the
Court in suppressing commercial speech for reasons other than keeping consumers "in the dark."
See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
204. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 503 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (joined by Kennedy, J. and
Ginsburg, J.).
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(1) Ambiguity About the Purpose of Commercial Speech Doctrine
Opposition to the suppression of truthful advertising to modify consumer
behavior may express judicial uncertainty about the constitutional purpose
of commercial speech doctrine. If that purpose were to protect market
efficiency, government efforts to shape consumer preferences by suppressing
accurate information about legal goods and services would be presumptively
improper. Such efforts would violate an independent First Amendment ideal
of consumer autonomy, conceptualized as the right of each consumer to receive
pertinent and truthful information about market choices. One hypothesis,
therefore, is that current dissatisfaction with Central Hudson reflects a resurgent
commitment to Blackmun's original claim that commercial speech doctrine
serves the constitutional purpose of ensuring "the proper allocation of resources
in a free enterprise system.""2 5
This account is most plausible with regard to Justice Thomas, because he
has expressed particular approval of Blackmun's claim,2" while at the same
time joining controversial opinions approving the suppression of com-
mercial speech to serve government goals ostensibly consistent with market
efficiency, like maintaining the reputation of the bar.07 Justice Stevens's back-
ground and expertise in antitrust has also seemed to endow him with an intense
appreciation of the centrality and significance of market institutions.08
Nevertheless, the Court has never squarely and unambiguously embraced
consumer autonomy and the free market as independent First Amendment
ideals. If recent controversy over the Central Hudson test signifies that the
Court is now ready to reshape First Amendment doctrine to reflect a con-
stitutional commitment to market efficiency and consumer sovereignty, it would
be best to have a full and candid assessment of that ambition.2" As I have
already suggested, I myself believe that the First Amendment should no more
205. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976).
206. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 505 n.3 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (implying that there is a similarity between the First Amendment and the philosophy
of Herbert Spencer); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 481-82 (1995).
207. See Went For It, Inc., 525 U.S. at 635.
208. See, e.g., Daniel Farber, The Scholarly Attorney as Lawyerly Judge: Stevens on Statutes,
1992-1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. xxxv, xxxvi-xxxvii.
209. For a good discussion tending toward this line, see Halberstam, supra note 6. Halberstam
views commercial speech doctrine as protecting the social norms implicit in commercial transactions.
He seems to assume that the First Amendment incorporates and enforces the norms of any
"bounded speech practice." Id. at 832-33. While I completely agree that these norms affect the
constitutional values that First Amendment jurisprudence is willing to locate in particular speech
practices, and therefore that these norms are highly material to locating the boundaries of public
discourse, it is not clear to me that the First Amendment necessarily accepts these norms as them-
selves meriting constitutional protection. That case has yet to be made.
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be interpreted to incorporate Milton Friedman than the Fourteenth Amend-
ment should be read to incorporate Herbert Spencer." '
(2) The Conflation of Commercial Speech and Public Discourse
A second source of contemporary opposition to the suppression of truthful
advertising to modify consumer behavior is the conflation of commercial
speech and public discourse. Within public discourse it is presumptively
improper to prohibit speech because it might be persuasive. In its early
decisions, the Court was prone simply to apply to commercial speech First
Amendment principles developed for the protection of public discourse."'
Prohibitions of truthful advertisements might thus seem especially suspect
because they are designed precisely to counteract the persuasive power of
speech.12
Justice Stevens has come close to explicitly defending this perspec-
tive. Because of his growing dismay at "the artificiality of a rigid
commercial/noncommercial distinction, 1 Stevens has sought to restructure
commercial speech doctrine to focus on the particular government interests
that justify differential treatment of commercial speech. He has argued that
"[it is the State's interest in protecting consumers from 'commercial harms'
that provides 'the typical reason why commercial speech can be subject to
greater governmental regulation than noncommercial speech.'
21 4
Justice Stevens has accordingly advanced a theory in which commercial
speech receives the same high degree of protection as public discourse, subject
only to the state's specific interests in averting commercial harms that might
justify more intrusive regulation of commercial speech.
When a State regulates commercial messages to protect consumers
from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or requires the
disclosure of beneficial consumer information, the purpose of its
regulation is consistent with the reasons for according constitutional
210. See Coll. Savs. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691
(1999) ("We had always thought that the distinctive feature of Lochner, nicely captured in Justice
Holmes's dissenting remark about 'Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,' was that it sought to
impose a particular economic philosophy upon the Constitution." (citations omitted)).
211. See, e.g., Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
212. See id. at 94, 96-97. This theme is explicit in Justice Stevens's early opinions. See, e.g.,
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 581-82 (1980) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
213. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 494 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring).
214. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 502 (1996) (Stevens, J., plurality
opinion) (joined by Kennedy, J. and Ginsburg, J.) (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,
507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993)). For a good example of academic perturbation at this position, see Van
Alstyne, supra note 9, at 1638-48.
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protection to commercial speech and therefore justifies less than
strict review. However, when a State entirely prohibits the dissemi-
nation of truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons
unrelated to the preservation of a fair bargaining process, there is far
less reason to depart from the rigorous review that the First Amend-
ment generally demands.21
This passage fundamentally challenges the entire conceptual structure
of Central Hudson, which conceives commercial speech as a discrete cate-
gory of communication that can be regulated for a wide variety of reasons.
Stevens, by contrast, denies that there is a categorical distinction between
commercial speech and public discourse. He therefore claims that the First
Amendment should apply to commercial speech the protections applicable
to public discourse, unless the government can adduce interests specifically
applicable to commercial speech, like "the preservation of a fair bargaining
process," which justify diminishing these protections."6 If Stevens's premises
are accepted, prohibiting advertisements to modify consumer behavior would
violate the First Amendment, because such prohibitions would not seek to
redress specifically commercial harms and because such prohibitions would
be per se unconstitutional if applied to public discourse.
There is good reason, however, to reject Stevens's premises. Stevens
accepts as a baseline for constitutional protection for speech a certain kind
of "rigorous review that the First Amendment generally demands," and he
believes that variations from this baseline should occur only as required by
the pressing necessities of distinct government interests. But Stevens never
inquires how this baseline of "rigorous review" has itself been determined.
If that baseline was actually developed to protect a specific constitutional com-
municative function, rather than "speech as such," it would be inappropriate
to apply it to expression not serving that function. Stevens never pursues
this inquiry, however, because he implicitly assumes that all speech serves
215. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501. "There is ... no question," Stevens writes, that a ban
on liquor advertising in order to reduce the consumption of alcohol "serves an end unrelated to
consumer protection. Accordingly, we must review the price advertising ban with 'special care,'
mindful that speech prohibitions of this type rarely survive constitutional review." Id. at 504 (quoting
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9).
216. Although Stevens does refer to "the reasons for according constitutional protection to
commercial speech," thereby implying that commercial speech might receive a distinct kind of First
Amendment protection, in contrast to the state having distinct and pressing reasons to regulate
commercial speech, he never inquires into the nature of these reasons or inquires whether they
might be different from those that justify "the rigorous review that the First Amendment generally
demands." The upshot is that in the absence of state interests specifically justifying the regulation
of commercial speech, Stevens assumes throughout his opinion that commercial speech ought to
receive the same "rigorous" protection as public discourse. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501.
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the same constitutional function and hence that all speech should be subject
to the same rigorous, baseline of protection..
But this assumption is manifestly false, as we have already seen in our
comparison of the Ohralik and Primus decisions.2"7 Although the state's inter-
ests in protecting clients from the potential harms of in-person legal solici-
tation were identical in each case, the Court nevertheless employed radically
different constitutional standards, depending upon whether it understood
public discourse or commercial speech to be at stake. The stark discrepancy
of constitutional method can be explained only by the distinct constitutional
values of public discourse and commercial speech.
There are many other examples of this same phenomenon. The govern-
ment has specific interests in managing its employees, including the speech
of its employees. These interests do not change if employee speech happens
to be about a matter of public concern, yet constitutional protections for
employee speech do change, because speech about matters of public concern
embodies a distinct.and greater constitutional value.21 For analogous reasons,
constitutional protections for defamation will vary depending upon whether
or not defamation is about a matter of public concern, although govern-
ment interests in protecting reputation remain constant.'1
9
Even Justice Stevens has recognized that different constitutional values
are immanent in different kinds of speech. In his recent opinion in Glickman
v. Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc.,220 for example, Stevens writes that com-
pelling persons to engage in "political" or "ideological" speech imperils
entirely different constitutional concerns than compelling persons to engage
in mere commercial speech.221 The former threatens fundamental First
Amendment interests of individual autonomy not present in the latter.
It is evident, then, that constitutional protections depend not only
upon the nature of government interests, but also upon the constitutional
significance of the speech that is regulated. The distinction between com-
mercial speech and public discourse is meant to mark precisely such a difference
in the constitutional value of communication. The distinction is no doubt
difficult and at points obscure, but its central thrust is to separate speech
that is constitutionally valued because it is itself a way of participating in
the processes of democratic self-governance, from speech that is constitu-
217. For a discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 130-134.
218. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145-54 (1983).
219. Compare Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), ith Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
220. 521 U.S. 457 (1997).
221. Id. at 469-72.
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tionally valued merely because within a public communicative sphere it
provides information relevant for democratic self-government.
This difference of constitutional value makes it dangerous to analyze
issues of commercial speech by uncritically relying upon First Amendment
intuitions developed in the arena of public discourse.2 The reason why the
First Amendment prohibits the state from suppressing public discourse on the
grounds of its persuasiveness is that participation within democratic self-
governance is understood to encompass a variety of social relationships, ranging
from dialogue to association to persuasion. Within public discourse, speakers
seek to persuade others of their point of view and in this way to make the
state responsive to their perspective; for the state deliberately to disrupt this
communicative relationship is to negate the very constitutional raison d'tre
of public discourse.
This analysis, however, is not applicable to commercial speech, which
is protected to ensure "the free flow of information and ideas."23 Thus when
the Court holds that the government can compel commercial speech, it
presumes that the state can diminish a speaker's persuasiveness in order to
facilitate the dissemination of accurate information. The doctrine is explicable
because the only social relationships that matter from a Meiklejohnian
perspective are those connected to the uptake and use of information by
citizens in democratic decision making. The interests of speakers in per-
suading others to action are not of particular constitutional moment24
This implies that in analyzing statutes suppressing accurate commercial
advertising, government purposes should be assessed on their own merits.
Government interests in promoting racial integration or energy conservation
222. I have argued elsewhere, for example, that the distinction between content-neutral and
content-based regulations is best interpreted as expressing understandings of specific government
purposes deemed impermissible within public discourse. See Post, supra note 37, at 1277-79. It is
therefore of no small significance that the distinction has virtually no application within the
domain of commercial speech, where most regulation is content based. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983).
223. Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 n.21 (1993).
224. We thus often regulate communication outside of public discourse for fear that it might
be persuasive. We restrict the speech of physicians, for example, for fear that they might cause
their patients to undergo medical treatments inconsistent with generally accepted medical practice.
See, e.g., Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980). We restrict the speech of
persons who would persuade others to break their contracts, for fear that their speech might
undermine important social policies promoting the stability and reliability of contractual under-
takings. See, e.g., Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 960 P.2d 513, 530 (Cal. 1998). We
restrict the speech of soldiers who would contest the orders of their superiors, for fear that their
speech might persuade others to mutiny. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976);
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974). These examples suggest that constitutional protection
for the "persuasive" power of speech does not automatically apply outside the boundaries of public
discourse, and that such protection depends very much upon specific social contexts. See CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 176 (1995).
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have their own weight and validity. They should not be automatically and
reflexively dismissed because of a speaker's interests in being persuasive.
(3) Opposition to Paternalism
State efforts to advance legitimate interests through the suppression of
accurate information, however, have aroused the suspicion of an increasing
number of Justices. Insofar as this suspicion focuses on the constitutionality
of government purposes, and insofar as it can be distinguished from a First
Amendment commitment to market efficiency or from a conflation of public
discourse with commercial speech, this suspicion seems to derive from a hos-
tility to paternalism that has been most explicitly articulated by Justice
Stevens:
Any "interest" in restricting the flow of accurate information because
of the perceived danger of that knowledge is anathema to the First
Amendment; more speech and a better informed citizenry are among
the central goals of the Free Speech Clause. Accordingly, the Con-
stitution is most skeptical of supposed state interests that seek to keep
people in the dark for what the government believes to be their own
good. One of the vagaries of the "commercial speech" doctrine in its
current form is that the Court sometimes takes such paternalistic
motives seriously.2
This is a powerful passage, whose perspective seems to be gaining ground
within the Court. To appreciate its reach and force, we must distinguish
between government efforts to alter public opinion by means of suppressing
advertising and government efforts to modify behavior by means of sup-
pressing the information contained in commercial speech. The paradigmatic
instances of this distinction are plain enough. We might contrast, for example,
a statute designed to inhibit public approbation of violence that prohibits
positive depictions of brutality in advertisements, with a statute designed to
discourage neighborhood gentrification that suppresses price information in
real estate advertisements. No doubt a good many difficult and obscure cases
will lie between these paradigmatic examples.
As we have already observed, the Meiklejohnian justifications for com-
mercial speech doctrine would render prima facie suspect government efforts
to alter public opinion by means of suppressing advertising. 2 Stevens's con-
demnation of paternalism, however, aspires to transcend this distinction and
to condemn as constitutionally improper even government efforts to modify
225. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 497 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
226. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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behavior by means of suppressing the information contained in commercial
speech. Stevens views such efforts as attempts "to keep people in the dark for
what the government believes to be their own good," and he charges that
"such paternalistic motives" are not be taken "seriously. 227
But the distinction we have just noted implies that government
"motives" in suppressing accurate commercial information need not be dif-
ferent from those that impel most ordinary legislation. In Linmark Associates,
Inc. v. Township of Willingboro,22 for example, the government forbade "for
sale" signs in order to prevent the blockbusting of a racially integrated
neighborhood.229 The regulation had nothing to do with the "good" of indi-
vidual buyers or sellers, but was instead enacted to preserve the possibility of
integrating housing. The ordinance was not paternalistic, at least as Stevens
seems to be defining the term. It did not regulate the behavior of indi-
viduals in order to protect them from themselves; it sought instead to achieve
a public good.
Similarly, when the government in Central Hudson prohibited energy
advertising to promote energy conservation, it was not for "the good of"
individual consumers, but instead aimed at the preservation of valuable
nonrenewable resources.23 A government effort to attain this very same end
by flatly prohibiting certain energy uses would not be dismissed as pater-
nalistic. Its purposes and motives would no doubt be taken quite seriously.
This suggests that the charge of paternalism is actually something of a
red herring. As Daniel Hays Lowenstein has observed, "it is simply not the
case that the commercial speech doctrine has been deployed against pater-
nalistic state measures. It would be far closer to the truth to say that
restrictions on commercial speech are usually struck down unless they are
intended to serve genuinely paternalistic purposes."2 ' Certainly our analysis
of the misleading requirement would support Lowenstein's conclusion, for
the Court has used this requirement to prohibit the circulation of infor-
mation on the blatantly paternalistic assumption that consumers are unable
properly to interpret commercial speech for themselves.
227. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. at 497. Part IV of Stevens's opinion in 44 Liquormart
gestures toward Stevens's arguments against paternalism. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
517 U.S. 484, 501-04 (1996) (Stevens, I., plurality opinion) (joined by Kennedy, J. and Ginsburg,
J.). These arguments are, however, most fully and forcefully developed in Stevens's opinion for
himself alone in Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. at 491-98.
228. 431 U.S. 85, 57-91 (1997).
229. See id. at 87-91.
230. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 568 (1980).
231. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, "Too Much Puff': Persuasion, Paternalism, and Commercial
Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1238 (1988).
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If there is nothing constitutionally suspicious about government efforts
to conserve energy or to integrate housing,, Stevens's discomfort with these
regulations must ultimately stem from the means by which the government
has attempted to achieve these otherwise legitimate purposes. In the end,
Stevens's argument turns on a fierce opposition to state regulations that
seek to ameliorate social problems by curtailing information rather than by
regulating behavior directly. By employing these means, Stevens suggests,
the state directly infringes First Amendment interests in "more speech and
a better informed citizenry."
These are certainly important interests, and they do evoke images of
independent citizens deciding for themselves how to use information. But
these interests are ruptured every time the government uses confidentiality
as a means to an end. Every confidentiality requirement suppresses the flow
of accurate information to citizens because of fear that persons will use or
respond to the information in a manner that might cause harm. They thus
compromise the autonomy of persons to receive and to act upon information.
Most states, for example, impose confidentiality requirements on grand
jury proceedings. These requirements prohibit a willing speaker from com-
municating with a willing audience. They do so in part in order to optimize
the performance of grand juries, because it is believed that their function
would be impaired were the flow of accurate information to citizens not
restricted. Yet grand jury confidentiality requirements are regarded as neither
paternalistic nor as anathema to the First Amendment."2 Nor is it regarded
as anathema when the federal government seeks to avert dangers to the
national security by prohibiting the dissemination of accurate information
that is classified or that concerns atomic weapons.23 Dangers to privacy
norms are averted by suppressing the circulation of medical records.' Dangers
to a well-functioning economy are averted by prohibiting the disclosure of
trade secrets.
235
Each of these regulations compromises the autonomy of persons to receive
and act upon information. Each poses serious First Amendment issues that
232. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2); Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441
U.S. 211, 218-19 (1979) ("We consistently have recognized that the proper functioning of our
grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.").
233. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 798 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2274 (1994); United States v. Boyce,
594 F.2d 1246, 1252 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990, 994
(W.D. Wis. 1979).
234. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10 (West 1982 & Supp. 2000); Pettus v. Cole, 49 Cal.
App. 4th 402 (1996). For a recent example of the Court upholding restrictions on the disclosure of
information in order to sustain privacy values, see Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 671 (2000).
235. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426 ('West 1997); E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v.
Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970); Bridge Publ'ns, Inc. v. Vien, 827 F. Supp. 629, 632-
33 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
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must be resolved by weighing the relevant state objective against the First
Amendment value of the prohibited speech.236 In none of these situations
would analysis be assisted by abstract charges of paternalism, or by generic
appeals to the need for "more speech and a better informed citizenry."
Instead, the strength and quality of the government's interest, its instru-
mental connection to the suppression of speech, the constitutional value of the
speech, and the practical availability of alternative modes of regulation,
would all require careful review.
In the particular environment of commercial speech, the justifications
for First Amendment protection do not suggest that government efforts
either to constrict consumer autonomy or to undermine the persuasiveness of
speakers should render regulation especially suspect. Instead, doctrine ought
to assess whether the "informational function" of commercial speech has been
unacceptably compromised. Such analysis in fact fits nicely with Justice
Stevens's appeal to the need for "a better informed citizenry." This appeal,
however, does not imply that state purposes in suppressing accurate infor-
mation in nonmisleading advertisements to modify consumer behavior need
be presumptively improper.237 When stripped of its rhetoric of "paternalistic
motives," Stevens's analysis actually implies the quite different proposition
that the effect of state regulations ought to be carefully monitored to ensure
that citizens retain adequate access to accurate and truthful information rele-
vant to democratic decision making.
b. The Central Hudson Test and the Impact of Government
Regulation on Commercial Speech
It is in fact surprising that the Central Hudson test refuses explicitly to
evaluate the impact of state regulations on the dissemination of information
contained in commercial speech. At most the test vaguely disfavors over-
inclusive statutes. Yet if commercial speech is constitutionally protected
because of its informational function, it would certainly seem to follow that
commercial speech doctrine ought self-consciously to safeguard this function.
The only hint of such an ambition, however, appears in footnote nine of
236. Even within public discourse, moreover, it is not "anathema" to suppress accurate speech
because it might cause harm, if the state does so in a content-neutral way. See Post, supra note 37,
at 1260-64. Even within public discourse, that is, the particular interests served by government
suppression of speech are of great significance.
237. Of course a state's purpose could be presumptively improper, if, for example, it were to
repress truthful nonmisleading advertising merely in order to keep consumers "in the dark." But
such a state purpose will no doubt.prove bizarre and rare. In most cases, a state will seek to suppress
advertising to serve perfectly acceptable social goals, as, for example, the attainment of energy
conservation.
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the Central Hudson opinion, which states: "We review with special care
regulations that entirely suppress commercial speech in order to pursue a
nonspeech-related policy. In those circumstances, a ban on speech could
screen from public view the underlying governmental policy.
238
Although the passage is somewhat obscure, its general thrust seems to
me basically right. If commercial speech is constitutionally valuable because
it conveys information to facilitate better public decision making, then
constitutional analysis ought to assess the impact of government regulations
on the circulation of information, using as a standard of assessment the
potential effect on public decision making and public opinion. Because any
such assessment will no doubt entail considerable guesswork, a workable rule
of thumb might well be that government regulations entirely eliminating a
category of truthful information are good candidates for heightened con-
stitutional suspicion.
The exact parameters of any such test would no doubt require much
careful consideration. The point I wish to stress here, however, is that although
recent dissatisfaction with the Central Hudson test has focused on the
impropriety of government purposes in suppressing truthful advertising, it is
possible that this dissatisfaction instead reflects the striking failure of the
Central Hudson test to assess how state regulations actually affect the infor-
mational function of commercial speech. Justice Stevens, for example, has
sought to resuscitate the doctrinal importance of footnote nine of Central
Hudson.239 Whether or not the exact formulation of footnote nine is ultimately
satisfactory, Stevens seems justified in urging that commercial speech doctrine
responsibly express the implications of its own theoretical foundations.
The inability of the Central Hudson test carefully to assess the impact of state
regulation on the circulation of information constitutes a serious deficiency.
CONCLUSION
Commercial speech doctrine is now almost a quarter of a century old.
Yet in all that time it has never systematically queried its own justifications
and implications. By settling quickly and easily into a test whose bland pro-
visions were indifferent to a disciplined account of the constitutional value
of commercial speech, the doctrine has allowed fundamental differences of per-
238. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 n.9 (1980).
239. In Part III of his opinion in 44 Liquormart, Inc., Justice Stevens draws heavily on footnote
9 of Central Hudson. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. ,v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 495-500 (1990)
(Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (joined by Kennedy, J., Souter, J., and Ginsburg, J.); Cent. Hudson,
447 U.S. at 566 n.9.
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spective to fester and increase. These differences now threaten to explode the
doctrine entirely.
Commercial speech doctrine initially developed on the assumption
that commercial speech was constitutionally protected because of its infor-
mational function. The pronouncement of the Central Hudson test pre-
maturely stunted the evolution of the doctrine, because the test did not seek
to explicate the implications of this function, either in the dimension of gov-
ernment purpose or in the dimension of impact on commercial speech.
Nevertheless, the Court also established a structure of rules that persisted
alongside of Central Hudson and that clearly sought to express a vision of
speech constitutionally valued merely as information.
Contemporary dissatisfaction with the Central Hudson test suggests
that this vision is now under considerable pressure. I do not believe that a
majority of the Justices will ultimately explicitly embrace market efficiency
as an independent First Amendment ideal. Nor do I believe that they will
throw aside as paternalistic all confidentiality provisions presently enforced
by the law.
My best guess, therefore, is that the commercial speech doctrine will
either continue to unfold the implications of its Meiklejohnian foundations
by developing the doctrinal tools necessary to assess the impact of state
regulation on the actual circulation of commercial information, or it will
abandon these foundations as the Justices seek to merge commercial speech
with public discourse. At least four Justices of the Court are now edging
toward an alternative perspective2. in which commercial speech is pro-
tected as a kind of public discourse subject to regulations designed to serve
specific state interests in preserving "a fair bargaining process." '241
It is not clear to me that this alternative perspective is ultimately coherent,
because interests in preserving a fair bargaining process are necessarily
paternalistic. They presuppose that consumers are vulnerable and dependent,
and these assumptions conflict with the autonomy that public discourse must
ascribe to citizens.42 A thorough assessment of the adequacy of this alternative
vision, however, should be put off to the day when its precise dimensions
240. See 44 Liquonmart, 517 U.S. at 502 (Stevens, J.) (joined by Kennedy, J. and Ginsburg, J.)
(quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993)); see also id. at 522
(Thomas, J., concurring).
241. Id. at 501; cf. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. at 428-31.
242. For a full discussion, see Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake, supra note 25, at 1128-33. It would
be quite inconceivable, for example, to regulate "misleading" political speech within public discourse
on the grounds that citizens are not autonomously capable of evaluating speech for themselves
and hence need protection from potential deception. Within public discourse, persons are presup-
posed to be independent and autonomous. If commercial speech were to be redefined as a variant
of public discourse, such independence and autonomy would also have to be ascribed to consumers.
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and structure become more visible. For the moment I wish only to observe
that a principled exposition of this perspective would require deep and sub-
stantial modifications to existing commercial speech doctrine.
The alternative vision implies, for example, that the First Amendment
could no longer countenance compelled disclosures within the realm of
commercial speech. If commercial speech were conceptualized as an effort of
citizens to render the state responsive to them, compelled commercial speech
would compromise the basic independence of citizens. Nor could the Court
any longer tolerate regulations of commercial speech that were significantly
more overinclusive than those accepted within public discourse. The same
precision of regulation would be applicable to both. Nor could the mis-
leading requirement any longer be employed, even in the limited form that
I have suggested is compatible with a Meiklejohnian perspective.243
The Court thus seems to be working its way toward a fundamental
choice. It can either continue the task of fashioning doctrine on the assump-
tion that the First Amendment safeguards the informational function of
commercial speech, or it can overturn its prior doctrinal structure and remake
commercial speech doctrine as though it were protecting participation within
the process of self-government. I do not think that the Court has thoroughly
canvassed the enormous implications of the latter alternative. One might
perhaps interpret the tentative speculation of some Justices concerning the
lack of a normative boundary between commercial speech and public discourse
as expressing their frustration at the manifest inadequacies of the Central
Hudson test, rather than as indicating a serious commitment to funda-
mentally reevaluating the significance and regulatory framework of com-
mercial speech.
My purpose in this Lecture has been to demonstrate that the major
outlines of contemporary commercial speech doctrine can be explained by
reference to a roughly Meiklejohnian perspective, so that the Central Hudson
test can in fact be subject to principled revision. This revision would require
the test both to articulate which government purposes are acceptable and
which are not, and to specify which impacts on commercial speech are accept-
able and which are not. It would also require that the misleading require-
243. I mention in text only revisions in those aspects of commercial speech doctrine that I
have already discussed in this Lecture. Other revisions would also be necessary. For example, most
regulations of commercial speech are content based. The constitutionality of such regulations
would present significant problems if commercial speech were conceptualized as a form of public
discourse. Moreover, if the flimsy claims propagated by the Court about the unique durability and
verifiability of commercial speech are not credited, the Court would also have to apply to commercial
speech the same chilling-effect analysis that it presently applies to public discourse.
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ment be employed only in a restricted way that refers to the structural relation-
ship between consumers and speakers.
Such revision would not, however, precipitate a total reconstruction of
the contemporary doctrinal framework of commercial speech. It would pre-
serve the distinction between commercial speech and public discourse, and
it would explain why the latter has always received different and greater
constitutional protections than the former. If these advantages are attractive
to a majority of the Court, commercial speech doctrine, as we now know it,
may just survive its present vicissitudes, as it has precariously survived those
of the past.
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